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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant developments in United
States law at the end of the twentieth century has been the
remarkable proliferation of new forms of business entities.
' The most widely adopted of these new forms of business entities is
the "limited liability company" or "LLC." See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The
Origins Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1459,
1475-78 (1998); Park McGinty, Eighth Annual Corporate Law Symposium:
Limited Liability Companies: The Limited Liability Company: Opportunity
For Selective Securities Law Deregulation, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 369, 370
(1996); Mark A. Sargent, Blue Sky Law: Will Limited Liability Companies
Punch a Hole in the Blue Sky?, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 429, 429-30 (1994).
Other new forms include the "limited liability partnership" or "LLP" and
the "limited liability limited partnership" or "LLLP." These new forms of
state-chartered business entities have joined the much older state-
chartered limited partnership and corporation forms as options for the
formation of a new business or the conversion of an existing business to a
new form. Other options are the traditional business forms that do not
require any filing with the state, the sole proprietorship and the general
partnership (and the general partnership's close relative, the joint
venture). For a brief overview of these business forms, see LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN & PETER V. LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS, at § 1.03 (4th ed.
2003). Other options also exist for special purpose business ventures, such
as the business trust and the joint stock company. For an overview of the
latter two forms, see WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP, at §§ 288-298 (business trusts) and §§ 282-287 (joint stock
companies) (3d ed. 2001). See also Robert C. Art, Conversion and Merger
of Disparate Business Entities, 76 WASH. L. REv. 349, 360-68 (2001);
Andrew J. Glendon, Review Of Selected 1996 California Legislation:
Business Associations and Professions: California's Limited Liability
Company Act Gets a Facelift, 28 PAC. L.J. 635, 636-37 (1997); McGinty,
supra, at 375-77. This proliferation of new forms of business entities has
caused concern among academics and practitioners. See generally
Symposium, Entity Rationalization: What Can or Should Be Done About
the Proliferation of Business Organizations?, 58 Bus. LAw. 1003 (May
2003). As the Reporter for the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (1994)
has observed:
Over the last decade, the law of unincorporated firms has
been atomized in three ways. First, new forms have been
introduced, particularly limited liability partnerships
(LLPs) and LLCs. Second, as to each business form,
statutory uniformity among the states has broken down.
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This "limited liability entity revolution" marked the end of a
century of relative stability in the law of business
organizations2 and provided the first meaningful new choice
of business form since the widespread adoption of the
corporate form at the end of the nineteenth century.' All
fifty states and the District of Columbia now provide for the
creation of both LLCs and LLPs.4
Third, we have permitted broader contractual modification
of noneconomic statutory provisions.
Donald J. Weidner, Symposium on the Future of the Unincorporated Firm:
Foreword to Freedom of Contract and Fiduciary Duty: Organizing the
Internal Relations of the Unincorporated Firm, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
389, 395 (1997).
2 Hamill, supra note 1, at 1460-61; Larry E. Ribstein, Statutory Forms
for Closely Held Firms: Theories and Evidence from LLCs, 73 WASH. U.
L.Q. 369, 404 (1995) [hereinafter Ribstein, Statutory Forms]. Cf. Robert
W. Hillman, Limited Liability in Historical Perspective, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 615, 615 (1997) ("The sudden emergence of new limited liability
vehicles-notably limited liability companies (LLCs) and limited liability
partnerships (LLPs)-suggests a revolution in the law of limited liability.
When placed in historical perspective, however, the developments of the
last decade can be seen as more evolutionary than revolutionary.").
3 Hamill, supra note 1, at 1460-61, 1484-1511; cf. Larry E. Ribstein,
Making Sense of Entity Rationalization, 58 Bus. LAW. 1023, 1023 (2003)
[hereinafter Ribstein, Making Sense] ("The world was once a simpler place
in which to form a business. One could choose between corporation and
partnership."). One exception, and to some extent a precursor to the
"limited liability entity revolution" of the late twentieth century, was the
development of the "professional service corporation" or "PSC" in the latter
half of the twentieth century, although the importance of that new form of
business entity was of course limited to professional service firms, and its
primary purpose and effect was with respect to the tax treatment of those
firms. See generally Thomas E. Rutledge, The Place (If Any) of the
Professional Structure in Entity Rationalization, 58 Bus. LAW. 1413, 1413-
19 (2003) (summarizing "The History and Structural Requirements of the
PSC").
4 See William H. Clark, Jr., Rationalizing Entity Laws, 58 Bus. LAW.
1005, 1005 (2003); see also Bruce D. Ely & Joseph K. Beach, The LLC
Scoreboard, 97 TAx NOTES 1463 (2002); Hamill, supra note 1, at 1460;
Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercing For All Limited Liability
Entities: Forcing The Common Law Doctrine Into The Statutory Age, 70 U.
CIN. L. REV. 95, 111 (2001); Fallany 0. Stover & Susan Pace Hamill, The
LLC Versus LLP Conundrum: Advice for Businesses Contemplating the
No. 1:1]
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The advantages of these new business forms are now
well-known.5  The LLC essentially combines the best
characteristics of the corporate form (limited liability for
members/owners)6 and the traditional general partnership
("pass through" tax treatment for members/owners if they so
Choice, 50 ALA. L. REV. 813, 815-16 (1999). Mr. Clark states that "[tlhe
adoption of LLC and LLP laws in all fifty states during the 1990s was the
direct result of a nation-wide legislative effort by the very large accounting
firms" in an effort to protect their individual members from personal
liability arising out of "a significant increase in the number of securities
law claims against accounting firms." Clark, supra, at 1006. Professor
Ribstein states that "[tihe initial Wyoming LLC statute was passed to deal
with the specific problems of [a particular oil company]," while the "LLP
statutes were instigated as a protective measure by Texas law firms
against liability in connection with the collapse of savings and loan
institutions." Ribstein, Making Sense, supra note 3, at 1023 (citations
omitted). For a more detailed discussion of the origin of the LLC form, see
William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents,
66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855 (1995). For a more detailed discussion of the
origins of the LLP form, see Robert W. Hamilton, Registered Limited
Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. COLO. L. REV.
1065 (1995).
5 See, e.g., Robert W. Hillman, Organizational Choices of Professional
Service Firms: An Empirical Study, 58 Bus. LAw. 1387, 1393 (2003).
Hillman notes that:
[dleveloped as a hybrid form of association, the limited
liability company (LLC) offers some of the advantages of a
corporation (most importantly, limited liability, unlimited
life, and centralized management) without certain of its
disadvantages (especially double taxation). It also offers
some of the advantages of a partnership (most importantly,
avoidance of double taxation) without certain of its
disadvantages (notably, unlimited liability).
Id. (citing LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATING, RIBSTEIN & KEATING
ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (West Group 1992).
6 See McGinty, supra note 1; Ribstein, Statutory Forms, supra note 2,
at 407-10 (1995); Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the
Corporation, 50 MD. L. REV. 80 (1991). See also Susan Pace Hamill, The
Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice For Doing Business?, 41
FLA. L. REV. 721, 735-36 (1989) (discussing limited liability advantage in
business organizations with emphasis on Wyoming and Florida LLC
statutes).
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desire),7 while providing flexibility as to organizational
structure and operating rules through a member-drafted (or,
one hopes more accurately in most cases, members'
attorneys-drafted) "operating agreement."8  The LLP
provides benefits similar9 to those of an LLC while retaining
the partnership form and most of the so-called "default rules"
applicable to general partnerships under state partnership
law statutes.' °
7 Hamill, supra note 1, at 1501-13; McGinty, supra note 1; Ribstein,
Statutory Forms, supra note 2, at 384-85.
8 See generally Mitchel Hampton Boles & Susan Pace Hamill, Agency
Powers and Fiduciary Duties Under the Alabama Limited Liability
Company Act: Suggestions for Future Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 143, 152-53
(1996) (discussing specifically the Alabama LLC act); Wayne M. Gazur &
Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 387, 408-09 (1991) (discussing the operating agreement provision of
early LLC statutory schemes).
9 With respect to LLPs, the key issue is the extent of protection
afforded by the LLP statute-is it "full shield" or "partial shield"
protection? See generally Clark, supra note 4, at nn.31-40 and
accompanying text (discussing the difference between full and partial
liability shields); see also Bruce A. McGovern, Liabilities of the Firm,
Member Guaranties, and the At Risk Rules: Some Practical and Policy
Considerations, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 63, 104-06 (2003); Carter
G. Bishop, Unincorporated Limited Liability Business Organizations:
Limited Liability Companies and Partnerships, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 985,
1020-21 (1995).
10 Pennsylvania's LLP law, for instance, provides:
Effect of Registration. As long as the registration under
this subchapter is in effect, the partnership shall be
governed by the provisions of this subchapter and, to the
extent not inconsistent with this subchapter, Chapter 83
(relating to general partnerships) and, if a limited
partnership, in addition, Chapter 85 (relating to limited
partnerships).
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8201(c) (West 2002). See generally David M.
Hastings, Annotation, Construction and Application of Limited Liability
Company Acts, 79 A.L.R. 5th 689, 698 (2004) (noting that states' LLC acts
are usually a hybrid of the partnership acts and business corporation laws
and in some instances the separate statutes are identical); THOMAS A.
HUMPHREYS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES AND LIMITED LIABILITY
PARTNERSHIPS § 1.02 (L. J. Press 2003); Larry E. Ribstein, Eighth Annual
No. 1:1] LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
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The LLC form, in particular, is fast becoming the
business form of choice for small start-up businesses.1" Small
businesses that twenty or even ten years ago might have
opted to incorporate are now choosing to do business as
LLCs. More important for purposes of this article, as the
advantages of the LLC form are becoming better known,
many individuals who in the past would have simply carried
on their business affairs as sole proprietorships are now
forming LLCs. 2 This is particularly true in states with LLC
statutes that provide for single-member LLCs."3 Even in
states that do not provide for single-member LLCs, it is
relatively easy for a sole proprietor to satisfy the statutory
requirements by having a family member or other trusted
person serve as an additional member of the LLC."4 This
trend is important because formation of an LLC may have an
unintended consequence that business owners (and even
their counsel) do not foresee at the time of formation-loss of
the sole proprietor's ability to assert a Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination when responding to a
Corporate Law Symposium: Limited Liability Companies: Possible Futures
For Unincorporated Firms, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 319, 323-27 (1996)
(discussing the LLP form generally).
1 See Daniel S. Goldberg, Choice of Entity For A Venture Capital
Start-Up: The Myth Of Incorporation, 55 TAX LAW. 923 (2002) (arguing
that the LLC is the most desirable start-up structure and is advisable by
most tax professionals); Stuart Levine, LLCs-The Swiss Army Knife of
Business Organizations, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS:
PARTNERSHIPS, LLCs, AND LLPs (SJ029), April-May 2004, at §§ 1.1 &
2.3.1.1-2.3.1.2; Stover & Hamill, supra note 4, at 838-40.
12 See Levine, supra note 11, at § 3 (discussing the tax consequences of
converting a sole-member LLC into a partnership and vice versa);
Hastings, supra note 10, at 705 (discussing a court's interpretation of the
rights and obligations of a sole proprietorship during conversion to a LLC);
HUMPHREYS, supra note 10, at § 3.03(1).
13 See, e.g., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8912 (West 2002) ("One or more
persons may organize a limited liability company under the provisions of
this chapter."); see also Bruce D. Ely & Beach, supra note 4, (noting which
jurisdictions do not provide for single-member LLCs); Ribstein, Statutory
Forms, supra note 2, at 414-15 (1995) (discussing number of members
required to form a LLC).
14 See HUMPHREYS, supra note 10, at § 3.03(1).
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grand jury subpoena or other compulsory process seeking his
or her business records. 5 Appreciation of this point requires
consideration of the "collective entity doctrine" that the
Supreme Court has developed when applying the Fifth
Amendment to business entities.
As is discussed in more detail below,16 in a series of cases
spanning the greater part of the twentieth century, 7 the
Supreme Court has held that corporations and other
"collective entities," such as partnerships 9  and
unincorporated labor unions,20 are not entitled to invoke the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court also has held that a sole shareholder of a corporation
may not assert the privilege against self-incrimination in
response to a subpoena for the production of documents of
the corporation,21 even when he is named in the subpoena
and he, not the corporate entity, is the target of the criminal
investigation.22  Thus, as Chief Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged in Braswell,23 the choice not to conduct one's
15 "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .... U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16 See infra Part III.
17 For an overview of the Supreme Court's collective entity doctrine
cases, see Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Production of
Personal Documents After United States v. Hubbell-New Protection for
Private Papers, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 133-39 (2002) [hereinafter Cole,
New Protection].
18 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
19 See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
20 See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
21 Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
22 See id. Justice Kennedy, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia, emphasized this aspect of the Court's
holding in Braswell: "The Court holds that a corporate agent must
incriminate himself even when he is named in the subpoena and is a
target of the investigation, and even when it is conceded that compliance
requires compelled, personal, testimonial, incriminating assertions." Id.
at 120.
23 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that:
[h]ad petitioner conducted his business as a sole
proprietorship, Doe would require that he be provided the
No. 1:1]
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business as a sole proprietorship also is, in practical effect, a
choice to waive any Fifth Amendment protection that might
otherwise apply to one's business records.24 For this reason,
the collective entity doctrine, and especially its application to
business entities that are owned and controlled by a single
individual, takes on heightened significance in the new era of
limited liability entities, many of which have supplanted sole
proprietorships and are owned and controlled by a single
individual.
One other point regarding the collective entity doctrine
should be noted at the outset of this Article.
Notwithstanding the "No person. .. " language of the Fifth
Amendment, the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment is the only provision of the Bill of Rights that
the Supreme Court has held to be completely unavailable to
corporations and other business entities.25 Even the First
opportunity to show that his act of production would entail
testimonial self-incrimination. But petitioner has operated
his business through the corporate form, and we have long
recognized that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment,
corporations and other collective entities are treated
differently from individuals.
Id. at 104.
24 See id. at 130 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Braswell was the sole
stockholder of the corporation and ran it himself. Perhaps that is why the
Court suggests he waived his Fifth Amendment self-incrimination rights
by using the corporate form."). Cf United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27
(2000) (applying the Fifth Amendment "act of production" doctrine to a
subpoena for the records of a business conducted as a sole proprietorship-
Webster Hubbell's consulting business). For an in-depth analysis of the
Hubbell case, see Cole, New Protection, supra note 17.
25 Professor Peter J. Henning has written an excellent article on the
Supreme Court's failure to develop a consistent approach to assertions of
constitutional rights by corporations in criminal proceedings. See Peter J.
Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a
Consistent Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in
Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN. L. REV. 793 (1996) [hereinafter Henning,
Corporate Constitutional Rights]. Professor Henning acknowledges that
the "seemingly ad hoc approach" the Court has taken in corporate
constitutional rights cases is contrary to the language of the Constitution
in that the Fifth Amendment, which the Court has said does not grant a
[Vol. 2005
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Amendment, which by its terms" seems better suited to an
application limited to individuals, has not been held to be
completely unavailable to business entities. Moreover, the
Court has repeatedly held that the protections of the Fourth
Amendment are available to corporations, 28 even though it is
privilege against self-incrimination to corporations, grants rights to any
"person" while the Fourth Amendment, which the Court has said does
apply to corporations, protects the rights of "the people." See id. at 796.
Professor Henning believes that this seeming inconsistency with the text
of the amendments "makes sense in light of the purposes of the two
constitutional protections and their relation to the government's need to
prosecute economic crimes by corporate, as opposed to individual, actors."
See id. at 797. He asserts that interpreting these two key constitutional
provisions in a manner that is inconsistent with their language is
acceptable because a corporate privilege against self-incrimination "could
completely frustrate the criminal prosecution of corporate wrongdoing"
while granting corporations Fourth Amendment protection from
unreasonable searches and seizures does "not insulate a corporation from
enforcement of the criminal law." See id. While Professor Henning's
argument no doubt accurately identifies the assumptions underlying the
Supreme Court's reasons for denying corporations a privilege against self-
incrimination, this Article challenges the validity of those assumptions
under a post-Kastigar and post-Fisher conception of the Fifth Amendment.
See infra Parts III.B and III.C.
26 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
27 See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)
(holding that the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech applies even
to corporate "persons"); see also Henning, Corporate Constitutional Rights,
supra note 25, at 798 n.19 (discussing the "purely personal" analysis used
by the Court in the Bellotti case). See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
CORPORATIONS § 1.4 (2nd ed. 2002); Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Federal
Constitution's First Amendment Guarantee of Freedom of Speech and Press
as Protecting Private Right to Refuse to Foster, Repeat, Advertise, or
Disseminate View, Message, or Statement Divergent from One's Own-
Supreme Court Cases, 132 L. Ed. 2d 961, 974-78 (1999).
28 See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); Oklahoma Press Publ'g Co. v. Walling,
327 U.S. 186 (1946); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968); G. M.
Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 353 (1977); Dow Chem. Co.
No. 1:1] LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
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the protections of that amendment that are most similar to
the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.29  For these reasons, and as
discussed in greater detail below,"° the collective entity
doctrine is an anomaly of constitutional criminal law. The
exploding use of new forms of limited liability business
entities, and the application of the collective entity doctrine
to those new entities, necessitates a re-examination of the
collective entity doctrine.
This Article analyzes the application of the collective
entity doctrine to the new forms of limited liability entities.
Part II of the Article reviews the development of the
collective entity doctrine. Part III reviews recent significant
developments in Fifth Amendment law on production of
documents and grants of immunity that are particularly
relevant to the collective entity doctrine. Part IV reexamines
the collective entity doctrine in light of changes in the law of
business entity criminal liability since the doctrine was
developed. Part V analyzes the application of the collective
entity doctrine to the new forms of limited liability entities.
Part VI concludes with a critical assessment of the collective
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). For an in-depth analysis of the
Court's opinions applying the Fourth Amendment to corporations, see
Henning, Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 826-41.
29 Professor Henning has also noted the anti-textual aspects of the
Court's application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendment to corporations.
See Henning, Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 796 ("The
Fourth Amendment provides that 'the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects' shall not be violated, while the
Fifth Amendment grants certain rights to any 'person.' Therefore, no
textual basis explains Hale v. Henkel's discordant treatment of the
corporation in criminal proceedings.") (citations omitted). Interestingly,
when the Court first addressed the application of the Constitution to a
subpoena for business records, it treated the Fourth and Fifth Amendment
protections as overlapping. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616
(1886). For further analysis of this aspect of the Boyd holding, see Cole,
New Protection, supra note 17, at 131-33. For an in-depth analysis of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendment underpinnings of the Boyd decision, see
Richard A. Nagareda, Compulsion "To Be A Witness" and The Resurrection
of Boyd, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1575 (1999).
30 See infra Part II.
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entity doctrine and its continued viability in the new era of
limited liability entities.
II. THE DUBIOUS ORIGINS AND
UNPRINCIPLED EXPANSION OF
THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY DOCTRINE
A. Historical Origins: Boyd and Hale
The Supreme Court first addressed the protections
provided by the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination
Clause3 in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States." In Boyd
the Court took an expansive view of the protection provided
by the Self-Incrimination Clause, asserting that "any
compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or
compelling the production of his private books and papers, to
convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to
the principles of a free government."" Boyd relied upon both
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to hold that the
Constitution does not permit a person to be compelled to
produce documents that will be used against him in a
criminal case. 4 As commentators have noted, the breadth of
3' The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment had little
practical effect for most of the nineteenth century, because under the
common law "party witness" rule of evidence a defendant was not
permitted to testify at his own criminal trial, even if he wished to do so.
See generally Cole, New Protection, supra note 17, at 131 nn.28-29.
32 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
33 Id. at 631-32. For an analysis of the broad scope of Boyd's holding
and how the Court has subsequently "whittled away the availability of the
Fifth Amendment privilege," see Peter J. Henning, Finding What Was
Lost: Sorting Out the Custodian's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
from the Compelled Production of Records, 77 NEB. L. REV. 34, 44-49
(1998) [hereinafter Henning, Finding What Was Lost] (analyzing how Hale
v. Henkel and Fisher v. United States affected the scope of the holding in
Boyd).
34 116 U.S. at 630. Boyd's dual reliance on both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments has been the subject of scholarly criticism. See Cole, New
Protection, supra note 17, at 123 n.40. See also Akhil Reed Amar & Renee
B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: the Self-Incrimination
No. 1:11 LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
the holding in Boyd threatened to undermine the ability of
the government to obtain documentary evidence in criminal
investigations of both individuals and corporations."
Recognizing the dramatic effect of such a rule on the criminal
justice system, the Court soon retreated" from the full
promise of Boyd's expansive interpretation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause.
1. Hale's Retreat from Boyd
The Court's first line of retreat from Boyd was to
distinguish between natural persons and corporations with
respect to the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Hale v. Henkel37 involved an
antitrust investigation of a corporation chartered under New
Jersey law.3" The secretary and treasurer of the company
Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 916 (1995) (stating that Boyd's "Fourth and
Fifth Amendment mishmash has now been emphatically rejected.").
35 See Henning, Finding What Was Lost, supra note 33, at 45 ("Taken
at face value, Boyd's broad interpretation of the constitutional privacy
right would make it virtually impossible to force any person to surrender
records in a government investigation."); Peter J. Henning, Testing the
Limits of Investigating and Prosecuting White Collar Crime: How Far Will
the Courts Allow Prosecutors to Go?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 416 (1993)
[hereinafter Henning, Testing the Limits] ("If taken to its logical extreme,
Boyd would prevent the government from obtaining any documents that
qualified as the property of the person subpoenaed, including a
corporation, because of the recognition that their entity has certain
property rights under the Constitution.").
36 A number of commentators have analyzed the Court's subsequent
decisions limiting the scope of the holding in Boyd. See, e.g., Nagareda,
supra note 29, at 1575; Henning, Finding What Was Lost, supra note 33,
at 44-49 (outlining the demise of the protection afforded in Boyd through
subsequent rulings); Henning, Testing the Limits, supra note 35, at 415-26
(describing the evolution of corporate Fifth Amendment law from Boyd to
Braswell); Robert P. Mosteller, Simplifying Subpoena Law: Taking the
Fifth Amendment Seriously, 73 VA. L. REV. 1, 51-59 (1987) (tracing the
doctrinal development from Boyd to Fisher); Robert Heidt, The Fifth
Amendment Privilege and Documents-Cutting Fisher's Tangled Line, 49
Mo. L. REV. 439, 444-70 (1984) (describing case law from Boyd to Fisher).
37 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
38 Id. at 75.
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was subpoenaed by a federal grand jury in New York to
appear before the grand jury and produce correspondence
and other records of the corporation.39 The official appeared
but declined to produce the subpoenaed records, asserting his
privilege against self-incrimination. ' °
In considering the corporate officer's assertion of
privilege, the Hale Court established two important
principles of Fifth Amendment law that have survived to the
present time. First, the Court made clear that the privilege
against self-incrimination is a personal privilege that cannot
be asserted by a witness to protect a third party from
prosecution, whether the third party is another individual or
a corporation and whether or not the witness is an agent of
the third party.4 The Court has consistently followed this
principle since it was announced in Hale.4 Although the
Hale Court cited no authority in support of its reasoning, 3
the conception of the privilege against self-incrimination as a
right that cannot be asserted to protect others is consistent
39 Id. at 45-46.
40 Id. at 70.
41 Id. at 69-70. In declining to adopt a rule permitting a witness to
assert the privilege against self-incrimination to protect a third party, the
Court observed that "[a] privilege so extensive might be used to put a stop
to the examination of every witness who was called upon to testify before
the grand jury with regard to the doings or business of his principal,
whether such principal were an individual or a corporation." Id. at 70.
42 As Justice Holmes said a few years after Hale was decided, "A party
is privileged from producing the evidence but not from its production."
Holt v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913). See also Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973) (citing the opinions of Justice Holmes in
Johnson and Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1910)). Cf.
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411-14 (1976) (discussing the
personal nature of the privilege and the fact that it cannot be asserted by a
taxpayer to block production by an accountant of the accountant's
workpapers for preparation of the taxpayer's tax return); Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (holding that the privilege against self-
incrimination cannot be asserted by a Communist Party treasurer as
grounds for refusing to answer grand jury questions regarding to whom
she turned over the party's financial books, thereby seeking to protect the
holder of the books).
43 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 69-70.
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with both the language of the Fifth Amendment" and the
Court's interpretation of other provisions of the
Constitution. 5 Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the
other general principle of Fifth Amendment law announced
by the Court in Hale.
After ruling that the privilege against self-incrimination
could not be asserted to protect third parties, the Court
turned its attention to the constitutional issues presented by
the compelled production of documentary evidence that
might be used against the corporation in a criminal
prosecution. The Court obviously recognized, even though it
did not explicitly acknowledge the point, that Boyd would
preclude compelling the corporation to produce the
documents if the holding of that case was not modified." The
Court first noted that its cases decided subsequent to Boyd
"treat the Fourth and Fifth Amendments as quite distinct,
having different histories, and performing separate
functions."47  Focusing on the Fourth Amendment, the
opinion concludes that the search and seizure clause of that
amendment should not interfere with the power of the courts
to compel, through issuance of a subpoena duces tecum,
production of documentary evidence for use in a trial.48 Hale
4 The Court had previously recognized this point in a different
context in another Fifth Amendment case. See Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) ("The object was to insure that a person should
not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give
testimony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a
crime.") (emphasis' added). The Hale Court, however, did not cite
Counselman.
45 See N. Jeremi Duru, A Claim for Third Party Standing in America's
Prisons, 20 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 101, 110-30 (2002) (discussing the history
of third party standing); Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984); Robert Allen Sedler, The Assertion of
Constitutional Jus Tertii: A Substantive Approach, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1308
(1982) (arguing, through case analysis, against any application of
constitutional rights by a third party).
46 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 70-71.
47 Id. at 72.
Id. at 73. The opinion asserts that if the courts did not have this
power it would be "utterly impossible to carry on the administration of
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thus marks the first step in the post-Boyd decoupling of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments in the context of compelled
production of documentary and other tangible evidence, a
process that would occupy the Court for much of the
twentieth century.49 For purposes of this Article, however,
the important aspect of the Court's analysis in Hale is the
principle the Court announced after it resolved to analyze
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments separately-the principle
that natural persons and corporations should be treated
differently under the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause."
The Hale Court's treatment of this issue is remarkable,
both for the almost off-handed manner in which it announced
a new constitutional principle and for the lack of depth of the
analysis the Court offered to support the new principle.51
justice." Id. (citing Summers v. Moseley, 2 CR. & M. 477). As is discussed
in more detail below, this concern with facilitating the administration of
justice also seems to have been the primary inspiration for the collective
entity doctrine, both as originally announced in Hale and as expanded by
the Court over the century following Hale.
49 For analysis of this aspect of this point, see Nagareda, supra note
29, at 1592-95 (discussing how the holding in Fisher decoupled the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments in relation to the production of documents);
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Documents and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 27 (1986) (arguing there is no clear
standard for regulating document subpoenas due to the Boyd Court's
misunderstanding and confusion of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and
the subsequent legal rulings that have exposed the unsound reasoning of
Boyd); Mosteller, supra note 36, at 4-11 (discussing how Fisher
fundamentally altered Fifth Amendment jurisprudence with respect to
documentary subpoenas) and 51-59 (discussing documentary subpoena
doctrinal development from Boyd to Fisher); Robert S. Gerstein, The
Demise of Boyd: Self-Incrimination and Private Papers in the Burger
Court, 27 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1979) (tracing the shift away from the Boyd
precedent by analyzing majority and dissenting opinions of subsequent
Supreme Court holdings).
50 See Hale, 201 U.S. at 74-75.
5' Professor Stuntz has aptly described Hale's response to the
corporate Fifth Amendment privilege claim as having been "rejected in a
single result-oriented paragraph." See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive
Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 429 (1995) [hereinafter
Stuntz, Substantive Origins]. One possible explanation for the Court's
No. 1:1]
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The Court cited no precedent for depriving corporations of
the privilege against self-incrimination, and appeared to
base its decision on practical expediency rather than a
principled rationale. 2 The primary concern motivating the
Court seemed to be that permitting a corporate
representative to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination as grounds for refusing to produce corporate
records "would result in the failure of a large number of
cases where the illegal combination" was determinable only
upon the examination of such papers."54
apparent lack of attention to the corporate Fifth Amendment claim is the
relative rarity of corporate criminal prosecutions at that time and the fact
that the Court would not even definitively resolve the issue of whether a
corporation could be held criminally liable for the acts of its agents until
three years later in the New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United
States case. See infra Part IV.A discussing New York Central and the
expansion of corporate criminal liability subsequent to the Court's decision
in that case. Professor Henning has noted that the Hale Court "was
unwilling to allow the assertion of the Fifth Amendment to nullify
congressional enactments regulating broad areas of the economy by
criminal authorities." See Henning, Corporate Constitutional Rights,
supra note 25, at 801 (citing Hale, 201 U.S. at 70, and William J. Stuntz,
Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 1941
(1993)). Professor Henning acknowledges, however, that the opinion in
Hale "failed to explain why corporations should be treated differently
under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Id. at 820.
52 See infra note 69. Professor Henning has identified Hale as the
starting point of the Court's consistent refusal to permit corporations to
assert the privilege against self-incrimination. See Henning, Corporate
Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 801 ("Since that decision, the
Court has rejected corporate claims to the privilege against self-
incrimination. This has been mainly because permitting assertion of the
right would have a deleterious effect on the enforcement of regulatory
provisions, which were designed to curb corporate misconduct.").
53 The specific concern with cases involving an "illegal combination"
reflects the fact that Hale involved a grand jury antitrust investigation.
201 U.S. at 74. Professor Henning argues that the Court's decision
in Hale to permit corporations to claim the protections of the Fourth
Amendment but deprive them of the privilege against self-incrimination in
the Fifth Amendment "makes sense in light of the purposes of the two
constitutional protections and their relation to the government's need to
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As this quote suggests, the real reason the Court
determined in Hale to deprive corporations of a Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is that
under the Boyd view of the scope of the privilege, which
prevailed at the time,55 holding otherwise would have made it
difficult for prosecutors to obtain evidence to support
prosecute economic crimes by corporate, as opposed to individual, actors."
See Henning, Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 797.
55 As discussed further in Part III.A infra, the Court also may have
been influenced by the state of the law at that time with respect to
immunity grants, which are the usual means by which prosecutors compel
production of evidence when a witness asserts the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Although not cited in the portion of
the Hale opinion addressing the application of the privilege against self-
incrimination to corporations, the Court's holding a few years earlier in
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892), which held that only full
transactional immunity is sufficient to overcome the privilege, is discussed
in some detail elsewhere in the Hale opinion. See 201 U.S. at 67-69. An
unstated corollary to the Court's concern about "the failure of a large
number of cases" if the privilege could be asserted by a corporate
representative on behalf of the corporate entity is that under Counselman
the corporation would have to be granted complete immunity from
prosecution if the government wished to compel the production of the
evidence that was being withheld. For a more detailed analysis of the
Counselman case and the Court's subsequent approval of "use and
derivative use" immunity in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972), see Amar & Lettow, supra note 34, at 874-80 (discussing evolution
of federal immunity case law); Henning, Testing the Limits, supra note 35,
at 442-49 (discussing the scope of immunity under the Kastigar and
Braswell with respect to Fifth Amendment protections). See generally
Karen E. King & Matthew B. Kilby, Thirty-First Annual Review Of
Criminal Procedure: III. Trial: Fifth Amendment at Trial, 90 GEO. L.J.
1690, 1702-06 (2002) (discussing use and derivative use immunity and
listing cases); Ryan McLennan, Supreme Court Review: Does Immunity
Granted Really Equal Immunity Received?, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
469 (2001) (discussing the Fifth Amendment and immunity in the Court's
decision of Hubbell); Leonard N. Sosnov, Separation Of Powers Shell
Game: The Federal Witness Immunity Act, 73 TEMPLE L. REV. 171 (2000);
Howard R. Sklamberg, Investigation Versus Prosecution: The
Constitutional Limits on Congress's Power to Immunize Witnesses, 78
N.C.L. REV. 153 (1999).
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criminal cases against corporations. 6 The analysis in the
Court's opinion that follows the recognition of this concern
describes the distinctions between natural persons and
corporations under the law at that time, but it provides little
explanation as to why those distinctions justify concluding
that a corporation is not a "person" entitled to the protections
afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment." Moreover, much of what the Court said about
56 As discussed in note 51 supra, Hale was decided at a time when the
application of federal criminal law to corporations was first being
addressed by the Court and was a matter of widespread public concern
and attention. See generally Stuntz, Substantive Origins, supra note 51, at
421-22 (discussing the Supreme Court's view of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century period
and the importance of federal efforts at economic regulation to the
development of constitutional criminal law in that period); Henning,
Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 807-12 (discussing late
nineteenth-century developments in the law of corporate criminal
liability). In fact, it was only three years after Hale that the Court
definitively addressed the constitutionality of criminal prosecutions of
corporate entities, concluding that such prosecutions were constitutionally
permissible. See New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481 (1909) (rejecting the argument that "owing to the nature and
character of its organization and the extent of its power and authority, a
corporation cannot commit a crime" as to which criminal intent is an
element); see also Henning, Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note
25, at 822-26 (describing "The Expansive View of Corporate Criminal
Liability in New York Central"); Henning, Finding What Was Lost, supra
note 33, at 45; Henning, Testing the Limits, supra note 35, at 405. Thus,
at the time Hale was decided the range of corporate exposure to criminal
prosecution was relatively narrow, making the Court's Self-Incrimination
Clause holding less important (and perhaps to some degree explaining the
somewhat casual manner in which the Hale Court reached its conclusion
on that issue). It is probably safe to assume that the Hale Court would
have devoted more attention to the issue had it been able to foresee the
tremendous breadth of potential corporate criminal liability at the end of
the twentieth century-a body of law of such broad coverage and
complexity that it likely would have been simply unimaginable, even for
Supreme Court Justices, at the beginning of the twentieth century. This
expansion of entity criminal liability and its importance to examination of
the collective entity doctrine is discussed infra, Part IV.
57 For an insightful analysis of the shortcomings of the Supreme
Court's "purely personal" test for determining whether constitutional
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the distinctions between corporations and natural persons
reflect now-outmoded nineteenth-century conceptions as to
the rights, privileges, and obligations of both natural persons
and corporations vis-A-vis the regulatory state. These
shortcomings in the Hale Court's analysis are discussed
below.
2. The Visitatorial Powers Rationale
The primary rationale advanced by the Hale Court to
support what the majority opinion candidly described as an
"opinion that there is a clear distinction in this particular
between an individual and a corporation"58 was the Court's
conception of the special relationship between the
corporation and the state. 9 Although the Court would later
abandon this rationale as support for the collective entity
doctrine," it is important to examine the original rationale
and recognize its limitations and shortcomings. This
examination suggests that the original foundation for the
doctrine was weak and shallow, so it perhaps is unsurprising
that the Court soon had to shore it up with analytical
reinforcements. The Hale Court distinguished corporations
from natural persons on the ground that "the corporation is a
creature of the State"61 and subject to "a reserved right in the
legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether
it has exceeded its powers." 2 This retained "visitatorial
power " " of the state over the corporation was the linchpin of
rights are available to corporations and other organizations, see Henning,
Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 798 n. 19 (analyzing
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)).
58 201 U.S. at 74.
*9 See id. at 74-75.
60 See infra, Part II.B.
61 201 U.S. at 74.
62 Id. at 75.
63 The term "visitatorial power" refers to "the policy that a corporation
is a creature of the state and is subject to greater, if not complete, scrutiny
by the state as part of the price of its existence." Norman M. Garland, The
Unavailability to Corporations of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination:
A Comparative Examination Based on EPA v. Caltex, High Court of
No. 1:11
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criminal cases against corporations. 6 The analysis in the
Court's opinion that follows the recognition of this concern
describes the distinctions between natural persons and
corporations under the law at that time, but it provides little
explanation as to why those distinctions justify concluding
that a corporation is not a "person" entitled to the protections
afforded by the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 7 Moreover, much of what the Court said about
56 As discussed in note 51 supra, Hale was decided at a time when the
application of federal criminal law to corporations was first being
addressed by the Court and was a matter of widespread public concern
and attention. See generally Stuntz, Substantive Origins, supra note 51, at
421-22 (discussing the Supreme Court's view of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments in the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century period
and the importance of federal efforts at economic regulation to the
development of constitutional criminal law in that period); Henning,
Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 807-12 (discussing late
nineteenth-century developments in the law of corporate criminal
liability). In fact, it was only three years after Hale that the Court
definitively addressed the constitutionality of criminal prosecutions of
corporate entities, concluding that such prosecutions were constitutionally
permissible. See New York Cent. & Hudson R.R. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481 (1909) (rejecting the argument that "owing to the nature and
character of its organization and the extent of its power and authority, a
corporation cannot commit a crime" as to which criminal intent is an
element); see also Henning, Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note
25, at 822-26 (describing "The Expansive View of Corporate Criminal
Liability in New York Central"); Henning, Finding What Was Lost, supra
note 33, at 45; Henning, Testing the Limits, supra note 35, at 405. Thus,
at the time Hale was decided the range of corporate exposure to criminal
prosecution was relatively narrow, making the Court's Self-Incrimination
Clause holding less important (and perhaps to some degree explaining the
somewhat casual manner in which the Hale Court reached its conclusion
on that issue). It is probably safe to assume that the Hale Court would
have devoted more attention to the issue had it been able to foresee the
tremendous breadth of potential corporate criminal liability at the end of
the twentieth century-a body of law of such broad coverage and
complexity that it likely would have been simply unimaginable, even for
Supreme Court Justices, at the beginning of the twentieth century. This
expansion of entity criminal liability and its importance to examination of
the collective entity doctrine is discussed infra, Part IV.
57 For an insightful analysis of the shortcomings of the Supreme
Court's "purely personal" test for determining whether constitutional
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Court's interpretation of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment,67 and even the then-established
scope of the state's visitatorial power68 did not support the
distinction adopted by the majority.69 The majority opinion is
DEL. J. CORP. L. 513 (1998); Henning, Corporate Constitutional Rights,
supra note 25, at 826-41; Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal:
Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990)
(discussing the relatively recent advent of bestowing Bill of Rights
protections on corporations); Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in
an Era of Multinational Corporations, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 283, 291-315
(1990) (discussing corporate personality and application of Constitutional
provisions to corporations).
67 201 U.S. at 84 (noting that the Court had previously refused to hear
argument on "the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" applies to
corporations, because the Court was "all of opinion that it does") (citing
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394, 396
(1886)). See generally Wood & Scharffs, supra note 66, at 552; Henning,
Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 804-06 (discussing the
case progression that led to the applicability of the equal protection clause
to corporations); Blumberg, supra note 66, at 291-315 (discussing
corporate personality and application of Constitutional provisions to
corporations).
68 As Justice Brewer's dissenting opinion observed,
The right of visitation is for the purpose of control and to
see that a corporation keeps within the limits of its powers.
... The fact that a state corporation may engage in
business which is within the general regulating power of
the National Government does not give to Congress any
right of visitation or any power to dispense with the
immunities and protection of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments.
201 U.S. at 87-88.
69 Although only two justices dissented, it is noteworthy that the
dissenting opinion cited numerous authorities in support of the proposition
that the state visitatorial power rationale did not justify depriving
corporations of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
see 201 U.S. at 83-89, while the relevant portion of the majority opinion
cites no authorities to support distinguishing between corporations and
natural persons for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, see 201 U.S. at 74-75. The lack of authority cited by the
majority, as well as its failure to address the substantial body of
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rooted in a nineteenth-century conception of broad individual
freedom of contract and freedom from government
regulation,"0 which the opinion contrasts with a narrowly
constrained and circumscribed conception of the corporate
entity and its ability to engage in economic activities.7'
authorities cited by the dissent, further supports the conclusion that the
majority's decision is based more on practical expediency-concern about
the effect of a contrary ruling on law enforcement and the ability of the
government to investigate corporate wrongdoing-than on a principled
legal rationale.
70 See 201 U.S. at 74 ("The individual may stand upon his
constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private
business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited.") (emphasis
added). For a detailed analysis of the nineteenth-century conception of
individual rights and the changes that accompanied the twentieth-century
rise of the modem regulatory state, see Alfredo Garcia, The Fifth
Amendment: A Comprehensive and Historical Approach, 29 U. TOL. L.
REV. 209, 211-38 (1998) (discussing historical origins of the Bill of Rights
and the Fifth Amendment); Mayer, supra note 66, at 579-620 (discussing
the changing political and regulatory systems between the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries in context with corporate personality under the Bill of
Rights).
71 In the words of Justice Brown,
[The corporation] is presumed to be incorporated for the
benefit of the public. It receives certain special privileges
and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the
state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are
limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by
its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only
preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation.
201 U.S. at 74-75 (emphasis added). For a detailed analysis of the shift
from nineteenth-century limited purpose, specially chartered corporations
constrained by the ultra vires doctrine to twentieth-century general
incorporation statutes and "purpose clauses" that permit corporations to
engage in "any lawful purpose," see Allen D. Boyer, Federalism and
Corporation Law: Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1037, 1043-56 (1986) (discussing incorporation shifts from the
nineteenth century and judicial responses to each shift); David Millon,
Frontiers of Legal Thought I: Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J.
201 (1990); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American
Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1662-72 (1988) (discussing ultra vires
and its changing nature throughout the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries). As two of the leading authorities in the field have observed, in
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Neither of these nineteenth-century conceptions survived
long in the twentieth century, as individuals' freedom of
contract and freedom from government regulation fell victim
to the New Deal and the rise of the modern regulatory
state, 2 while at the same time modern business corporations
took advantage of general incorporation statutes and shed
the constraints imposed by special purpose charters and
ultra vires doctrine limitations on the scope of their
activities." These important changes in the legal concepts
employed by the Hale Court to justify the collective entity
doctrine demonstrate that the doctrine was originally based
upon a rationale that was anachronistic even at the time it
was announced by the Court.
Had the Court continued to rely upon the visitatorial
powers rationale for the collective entity doctrine, it would
have been important to analyze whether the twentieth-
century changes to the law in this area had deprived the
doctrine of its conceptual underpinnings. It is not necessary
to do so, however, because the Court subsequently
abandoned its original rationale for the collective entity
doctrine-not because it recognized that the rationale had
lost its vitality, but rather because the original rationale
proved inadequate to support the doctrine in the new, non-
corporate law enforcement contexts that the Court had to
the "earlier day" prior to the development of the modern business
corporation, "corporate status was a privilege jealously guarded by the
state and the courts so that the inherent powers of corporations were
narrowly authorized and recognized." JAMES D. Cox & THOMAS LEE
HAZEN, CORPORATIONS, § 4.02 (2d ed. 2003).
12 See generally Henning, Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note
25 (arguing that the Supreme Court should directly address the issue of
corporate criminal rights and in doing make a concrete determination of
what constitutional protections should apply to corporations); Mayer,
supra note 66, at 577.
73 See generally Gregory A. Mark, The Court and The Corporation:
Jurisprudence, Localism, and Federalism, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 403 (1997)
(discussing the evolution of American corporations); Mayer, supra note 66,
at 579-620 (discussing the changing political and regulatory systems
between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in context with corporate
personality under the Bill of Rights); Hovenkamp, supra note 71, at 1593.
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confront. Those new contexts, and the Court's
reconceptualization of the collective entity doctrine to extend
beyond business corporations, are discussed below.
B. Evolution of the Doctrine: Abandonment of the
Original Visitatorial Powers Rationale and
Employment of Result-Oriented Legal Analysis
The Supreme Court returned to the collective entity
doctrine announced in its Hale decision five years later when
it decided Wilson v. United States. 74 In Wilson, the president
of a corporation that had been served with a federal grand
jury subpoena duces tecum refused to produce corporate
documents75 sought by the grand jury in an investigation7 1 of
the officers77  of the corporation for possible criminal
offenses.8  As grounds for refusing to produce the
subpoenaed corporate documents," Wilson asserted that he
was using them to prepare his defense and that their
contents would tend to incriminate him.8 °  In rejecting
Wilson's arguments8' the Court held that a corporate officer
74 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
75 The subpoena called for the production of any of the corporation's
letter press copy books that contained copies of correspondence signed by,
or purporting to be signed by, the president of the corporation during the
months of May and June, 1909. Id. at 368.
76 Id. at 367-68.
77 Indictments had been filed against the president, as well as certain
other officers, directors, and stockholders of the corporation. Id. at 367.
78 The indictments charged the targets with one count of mail fraud
and one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud. Id.
79 Wilson claimed that, in addition to business correspondence, the
documents contained copies of his personal and other correspondence; that
the documents were in his possession, custody, and control as against
other officers of the corporation; and that the documents contained
information that would tend to incriminate him. Id. at 368-69.
80 Id. at 369.
81 In addition to arguing that compelling him to turn over the
documents violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, Wilson argued that it violated the Sixth Amendment
witness confrontation privilege and the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 375-76.
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cannot refuse to produce corporate documents under that
officer's control to a grand jury, even if the target of the
grand jury investigation is the officer and not the
corporation.82 The Court reaffirmed its holding in Hale that
a corporation has no privilege against self-incrimination,83
and concluded that it would be an "unjustifiable extension" of
personal rights to permit Wilson to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as grounds
for refusing to produce corporate documents when the
corporation itself could assert no such right as to the
documents.8"
1. The Primacy of Protecting Law Enforcement
Interests Emerges as the Court's Motivating
Objective
Although the Wilson holding was significant for corporate
officers and employees seeking to oppose production of
corporate records because those records might incriminate
them personally,85 its importance for purposes of this Article
is the Court's analysis of the Fifth Amendment's application
to corporations. In this regard, the Court first stated its
agreement with the Boyd premise that the Fifth Amendment
protects an individual from compulsory production of any
82 Id. at 384-85.
83 Id. at 383-84 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906)).
' Id. at 385.
85 The dubious validity of the Court's reasoning in Wilson is illustrated
in a wonderfully understated critique offered by Professor Stephen J.
Schulhofer:
For example, Smith, the treasurer of XYZ Corporation, can
be compelled to produce corporate documents that
incriminate her. Technically the documents belong to the
corporation, so that in effect one party (XYZ) is being
compelled (through its treasurer) to incriminate an entirely
different party (Smith). If you can't see the difference
between Smith and the treasurer, then you just aren't
thinking like a lawyer.
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 315 (1991) (citing Wilson).
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"private books and papers" that might be incriminatory.86
The Court then addressed whether an individual's personal
privilege against self-incrimination should "extend to the
corporate books?"87 Dictum in its analysis of this question
reveals just how broadly the Court at that time, applying the
Boyd conception of the Fifth Amendment, interpreted the
privilege against self-incrimination's application to an
individual's personal documents: "Where one's private
documents would tend to incriminate him, the privilege
exists although they were actually written by another
person."88 This remarkable assertion, 9 although dictum to
the Wilson holding, is important because it illustrates the
consequences that would have followed if the Court, under
the Boyd conception of the Fifth Amendment privilege in
effect at the time, had permitted corporate entities to assert
the privilege against self-incrimination in response to law
enforcement subpoenas and document requests. As the
quoted statement suggests, all potentially incriminating
documents in the possession and control of the corporation,
no matter who authored them or for what purpose, could
have been withheld from production. It is therefore not
surprising that in both Hale in 1906, as discussed above, and
in Wilson in 1911, as discussed below, the Court stretched for
a way to avoid that result. This is in stark contrast to the
state of the law today, under the post-Fisher "testimonial
communications" conception of the privilege and the act of
production doctrine that would apply if corporations and
Wilson, 221 U.S. 261 at 377 ("Undoubtedly it also protected him
against the compulsory production of his private books and papers."). See
also id. at 380 (noting that "in the Boyd Case .. . the fact that the papers
involved were the private papers of the claimant was constantly
emphasized") (emphasis in original).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 378.
89 This assertion is, of course, totally contrary to the modern
conception of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
that was announced by the Court in 1976 in Fisher v. United States, 425
U.S. 391 (1976). The Fisher decision is discussed infra, Part III.B.1.
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other business entities were permitted to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 90
In 1911, however, the Court was unwilling to consider the
consequences of permitting a corporation to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The Wilson
Court even drew upon the "required records" exception 91 to
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
its analysis of the application of the privilege to
corporations.92 After discussing cases involving various kinds
of records that were required by law to be kept and open to
inspection by governmental authorities,93  the Court
acknowledged that the records of a private business
corporation are not public records that must be open to
general inspection. After this brief foray into the required
records exception, the Court retreated to the distinction
announced in Hale-that "the corporate form of business
activity, with its chartered privileges, raises a distinction
when the authority of government demands the examination
of books."99 Beyond a citation to its recently announced
decision in Hale,9" however, the Court offered no authority or
analysis to support its conclusion that this "reservation of
the visitatorial power of the State"97 should justify depriving
corporations of a constitutional right. Ironically, the only
legal analysis undertaken by the Court, its examination of
the required records exception, would seem to have better
supported the contrary conclusion.
90 See infra Part III.B.
91 For analysis of the historical development of the required records
exception, see Henning, Finding What Was Lost, supra note 33, at 34 n.51;
Amar & Lettow, supra note 34, at 869-73; Henning, Testing the Limits,
supra note 35, at 439-41; Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records
Doctrine: Its Lessons for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U.
CHi. L. REV. 6 (1986).
92 See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 380-82.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 382.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 383.
97 Id.
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As was the case with Hale, the Court's real reason for
resisting any corporate assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination was reluctance to interfere with law
enforcement. The Court's primary concern was that "[t]he
reserved power of visitation would seriously be embarrassed,
if not wholly defeated in its effective exercise, if guilty
officers could refuse inspection of records and papers of the
corporation."98  Wilson thus extends the result-oriented
reasoning of Hale, essentially giving law enforcement
officials carte blanche to compel production of all manner of
corporate records in investigations of both a corporate entity
and of the individual agents serving a corporation. Although
this result gave law enforcement authorities extraordinarily
broad power to demand production of evidence,99  it
nonetheless proved insufficient to meet the needs of law
enforcement authorities. This failure to meet law
enforcement needs ultimately led to the abandonment of the
visitatorial powers rationale and the adoption of a new, even
more permissive test for depriving subjects of an
investigation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
98 Id. at 384-85.
99 As Justice McKenna pointed out in his dissent in Wilson, this result
was inconsistent with the English case law addressing this issue. See id.
at 388-90. The majority declined even to consider the English precedent,
however, stating that those cases "cannot be deemed controlling" and
declaring that "[t]he corporate duty, and the relation of the appellant as
the officer of the corporation to its discharge, are to be determined by our
laws." Id. at 386. It also should be noted that the net result of Hale and
Wilson was to give law enforcement authorities power to compel
corporations to produce voluntarily documents and other evidence that the
Fourth Amendment would prevent the authorities from obtaining if they
lacked probable cause and particularity requirements. Cf. Cole, New
Protection, supra note 17, at 170-90 (comparing and contrasting the ability
of law enforcement authorities to obtain evidence by search warrant under
the Fourth Amendment and by subpoena under the Fifth Amendment).
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2. The Visitatorial Powers Rationale Proves
Inadequate to Protect Law Enforcement
Interests
The inherent limitations of the visitatorial powers
rationale were exposed in 1944, in United States v. White,1°° a
case involving a federal grand jury subpoena duces tecum
issued to an unincorporated labor union.' The president of
the union, who had possession of the subpoenaed union
records, refused to comply with the subpoena, asserting that
doing so might incriminate the union, himself as an officer of
the union, or himself individually. 2 The district court held
him in contempt for his refusal to produce the subpoenaed
records, but the court of appeals reversed, by a divided vote,
holding that the records of an unincorporated union were the
property of the union members, and as a union member he
could refuse to produce the union records if they would
incriminate him as an individual.'
The holding of the court of appeals forced the Supreme
Court to confront the limitations of its previous holdings in
this area, because the corporate entity/visitatorial powers
arguments obviously could not be brought to bear upon an
unincorporated organization with no charter or license from
the state. The Court responded with the two lines of
reasoning that mark all of its opinions in this area. The first
is a categorical assertion, without analytical support, that
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
a "personal" and "individual" privilege, and therefore it
"cannot be utilized by or on behalf of any organization, such
100 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
101 Id. at 695-96. The subpoena was directed to "Local No. 542,
International Union of Operating Engineers" in an federal grand jury
investigation of "alleged irregularities in the construction of the
Mechanicsburg Naval Supply Depot" in Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania. Id.
at 695.
102 Id. at 696.
'o3 Id. at 696-97.
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as a corporation."'' °  The second is a thinly veiled
acknowledgement that permitting a business entity to assert
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, as
it was then understood to apply to documentary evidence,0°
would be too great an impediment to the investigation and
prosecution of business crime.' The White Court was more
candid than its predecessors17 in acknowledging this point,
104 Id. at 698-99 (citing Hale and Wilson). See supra note 69 for
discussion of the Hale Court's failure to provide any precedent or authority
to support depriving corporations of the privilege against self-
incrimination, and see supra text accompanying notes 97 & 98 for
discussion of the Court's failure to offer any authority or analysis to
support its conclusion in Wilson that the "reservation of the visitatorial
power of the State" should justify depriving corporations of a
constitutional right.
105 See infra Part III for a discussion of the recent changes in the
Court's conception of the application of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to documentary evidence.
106 In the words of the White Court:
The reason underlying the restriction of this constitutional
privilege to natural individuals acting in their own private
capacity is clear. The scope and nature of the economic
activities of incorporated and unincorporated organizations
and their representatives demand that the constitutional
power of the federal and state governments to regulate
those activities be correspondingly effective. The greater
portion of evidence of wrongdoing by an organization or its
representatives is usually to be found in the official records
and documents of that organization. Were the cloak of the
privilege to be thrown around these impersonal records and
documents, effective enforcement of many federal and state
laws would be impossible. The framers of the
constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-
disclosure, who were interested primarily in protecting
individual civil liberties, cannot be said to have intended
the privilege to be available to protect economic or other
interests of such organizations so as to nullify appropriate
governmental regulations.
322 U.S. at 700 (citations omitted).
107 Compare White, 322 U.S. at 700 (acknowledging that if business
entities were permitted to assert the privilege against self-incrimination
"effective enforcement of many federal and state laws would be
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perhaps out of necessity because it was forced to abandon the
visitatorial power rationale. 8 and perhaps out of boldness as
a result of almost a half-century of acceptance of the rule
announced in Hale.
The Court went on to hold that an unincorporated labor
union could not assert the privilege against self-
incrimination.'0 9  In abandoning the visitatorial power
rationale, the Court announced a new test for when an
organization would not be permitted to assert the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The test
articulated by the Court was "whether one can fairly say
under all the circumstances that a particular type of
organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its
membership and activities that it cannot be said to embody
or represent the purely private or personal interest of its
constituents, but rather to embody their common or group
interests only.""0 The Court relied upon"' this new test to
impossible") with Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74 (1906) (warning of "the
failure of a large number of cases" if corporations were permitted to assert
a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
108 The White Court characterized the visitatorial power rationale as
merely "a convenient vehicle for justification of governmental investigation
of corporate books and records," 322 U.S. at 700, informing the careful
reader that the visitatorial powers doctrine had never been more than a
convenient doctrinal means of reaching the desired result, which the White
Court acknowledged was "effective enforcement of many state and federal
laws." Id.
109 Id. at 700-01. The Court subsequently characterized the rationale
of Wilson as the "visitorial powers doctrine." See Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 92 (1974). In Bellis the Court recast the visitatorial powers
doctrine as "a recognition that corporate records do not contain the
requisite element of privacy or confidentiality essential for the privilege to
attach." Id. This recharacterization reflects the inadequacy of the
visitatorial powers doctrine to justify withholding the privilege from
collective entities that are not chartered by the State. Ultimately even the
"privacy or confidentiality" rationale fell by the wayside, when the Fisher
decision shifted the focus of Fifth Amendment analysis from privacy to the
compulsion of "testimonial" communications. See infra Part II.B.1.
11 322 U.S. 701. Ironically, the Court would later dismiss this test as
essentially worthless as it continued its result-oriented efforts to limit the
application of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to
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conclude that a labor union could not assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege, and therefore a union official".2 could
not refuse to produce union documents' even though they
might incriminate him."'
White is a particularly significant step in the evolution of
the collective entity doctrine, because the Court both
abandoned the prior rationale for the doctrine and
acknowledged that the doctrine was in reality nothing more
than a means to accomplish a law enforcement end that the
Court concluded had to be facilitated. Even the broad,
elastic new test that the Court articulated, while perhaps
intended to resolve the issue for future cases, ultimately
proved inadequate to satisfy the needs of law enforcement for
access to the documents and records of business entities.
even small business entities so as to avoid interfering with law
enforcement investigations and prosecutions of such entities. See Bellis,
417 U.S. at 100 (applying the collective entity doctrine to a three-person
law partnership and noting that the White test was "is not particularly
helpful in the broad range of cases" and that the White Court "after stating
its test, did not really apply it, nor has any of the subsequent decisions of
this Court").
1 As indicated supra, note 110, the Court subsequently acknowledged
in Bellis that the White Court "did not really apply" its test to the facts of
that case, an implicit acknowledgment of the shallow, result-oriented
analysis that this Article asserts has been consistently employed by the
Court in its collective entity cases since the doctrine was first announced
in Hale. See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100.
1 White described himself as an "assistant supervisor" of the union.
322 U.S. at 695.
1 Although White possessed the requested union documents, he was
not the authorized custodian of the requested documents. Id.
1 The White Court cited Hale and Wilson as establishing that the
privilege against self-incrimination is not available to corporations and
therefore corporate officials cannot assert the privilege against self-
incrimination when responding to a subpoena duces tecum for corporate
documents even though the corporate documents might incriminate the
officials personally. Id. at 699-700.
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LA W REVIEW [Vol. 2005
No. 1:1] LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
3. Bellis and the Personal Privacy and
Representative Capacity Rationales
The needs of law enforcement led the Court to stretch the
collective entity doctrine even further in 1974,115 when it
explored what it described as "the outer limits of the analysis
of the Court in White" in the case of Bellis v. United States.16
In Bellis, the Court concluded that a former partner of a
dissolved three-person law partnership, who had retained
custody of the dissolved partnership's business records,117
could not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in
response to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum for those
records issued in "a tax investigation directed against Bellis
personally."'
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall reasoned that a
partnership is not a natural person' 19 and that a partner in a
115 Ironically, only two years later, the Court would decide Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the case that would re-define Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination law and render moot the concerns that the
Court had struggled to accommodate since the turn of the century as it
relentlessly expanded the reach of the collective entity doctrine. The
impact of Fisher and the reasons why it obviated the law enforcement
needs that gave birth to and sustained the collective entity doctrine are
discussed infra, Part III.B.1.
116 417 U.S. at 94.
117 The three-person Pennsylvania law partnership had dissolved
almost four years earlier, when Bellis had left the firm, but was still
"winding up its affairs" when the subpoena was served. Id. at 86. Under
the applicable Pennsylvania law, a partnership was not terminated "until
the winding up of the partnership affairs [was] completed." Id. (citing PA.
STAT. ANN., tit. 59, § 92 (1964)).
118 Justice Douglas stressed this aspect of the case, that Bellis
personally, and not the dissolved law partnership, was the target of the
investigation. See 417 U.S. at 101.
119 Justice Marshall cited to previous Supreme Court decisions that
had uniformly held that the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination protects "only the natural individual from compulsory
incrimination through his own testimony or personal records." Id. at 89-90
(quoting White, 322 U.S. at 701). The Court's focus on the rights of
individuals was accompanied by a concern regarding law enforcement
against large collective entities. As Justice Marshall observed, "[t]he
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partnership had no expectation of privacy with respect to the
financial records of an organized entity such as his
partnership. 2 ' Justice Marshall's opinion in Bellis marks the
first time, post-Boyd, that the Court relied explicitly upon
personal privacy or confidentiality as a policy interest
protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. His majority opinion even cites the Court's
most controversial privacy opinion,'21  Griswold v.
Connecticut,"' as supporting recognition of a privacy
rationale for application of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination.'23 He went on to conclude that
"[plrotection of individual privacy was the major theme
running through the Court's decision in Boyd"'24 and that "it
was on this basis that the Court in Wilson distinguished the
corporate records involved in that case from the private
framers of the constitutional guarantee against compulsory self-disclosure,
who were interested primarily in protecting individual civil liberties,
cannot be said to have intended the privilege to be available to protect
economic or other interests of such organizations so as to nullify
appropriate governmental regulations." 417 U.S. at 91 (quoting White, 322
U.S. at 700).
12 417 U.S. at 90-91.
121 See generally Samuel J. Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional
Rights And Unenumerated Biblical Obligations: A Preliminary Study In
Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 511, 519-20 (1998)
(discussing the controversy of Griswold and the subsequent line of right to
privacy cases); Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold
to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1994); Louis Henkin, Privacy
and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1421-22 (1974) (questioning
reliance on penumbra of Bill of Rights to find a privacy right); Robert
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 9 (1971) (criticizing Griswold as unprincipled).
122 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
123 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 91 (the Court, citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484,
and Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973), concluded that "the
Fifth Amendment 'respects a private inner sanctum of individual feeling
and thought'" from "state intrusion to extract self-condemnation") (quoting
Couch, 409 U.S. at 327)).
124 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 91 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886)).
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papers at issue in Boyd."125 The latter assertion borders on
disingenuous when one considers that the papers at issue in
Boyd-invoices for plate glass purchases"28-could hardly be
characterized as more "private" than the corporate
documents at issue in Wilson-copies of letters and
telegrams signed by the president of the corporation relating
to alleged antitrust violations.127 The underlying hint of
result-oriented legal reasoning is reinforced if one also
considers that what Justice Marshall called "the private
papers at issue in Boyd"'28 were actually the business records
of a partnership' 29-the same kind of documents the
government was seeking in Bellis. Nonetheless, Justice
125 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 91-92 (citing Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S.
361, 377, 380 (1911)).
126 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 619 (identifying the documents at issue as "the
invoice from the Union Plate Glass Company or its agents, covering the
twenty-nine cases of plate glass marked G.H.B., imported from Liverpool,
England, into the port of New York in the vessel Baltic, and entered by E.
A. Boyd & Sons at the office of the collector of customs of the port and
collection district").
127 See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 368 (quoting the grand jury subpoena at
issue in that case).
128 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92.
129 Justice Marshall does acknowledge this similarity between the
Boyd and Bellis cases at a later point in his Bellis opinion, where a
footnote concedes that although E.A. Boyd & Sons was a partnership, "at
this early stage in our Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, the potential
significance of this fact was not observed by either the parties or the
Court. The parties treated the invoice at issue as a private business
record, and the contention that it might be a partnership record held in a
representative capacity, and thus not within the scope of the privilege, was
not raised." Id. at 95 n.2. Relying upon the undeveloped state of Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination law when Boyd was
decided, he asserts "We do not believe that the Court in Boyd can be said
to have decided the issue presented today." Id. (citation omitted). He
goes on to note that the Boyd Court "did not inquire into the nature of the
Boyd & Sons partnership or the capacity in which the invoice was acquired
or held" and concludes "Absent such an inquiry, we are unable to
determine how our decision today would affect the result of Boyd on the
facts of that case." Id. (citation omitted). In this manner the Bellis Court
was essentially able to overrule Boyd and reject its Fifth Amendment
holding without explicitly acknowledging that it had done so.
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Marshall used the privacy rationale as a means to avoid
abandoning Boyd while at the same time expanding the
reach of the collective entity doctrine to encompass even
small partnerships.
After identifying personal privacy as a policy interest
protected by the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination
Clause, Justice Marshall employed a clever bit of juridical
sleight-of-hand to link the new privacy rationale to the
original state visitatorial power rationale of the collective
entity doctrine. He described the visitatorial power doctrine
as having "modern-day relevance" because it "can easily be
understood as a recognition that corporate records do not
contain the requisite element of privacy or confidentiality
essential for the [Fifth Amendment] privilege to attach."3 °
He adopted this new interpretation of the visitatorial power
rationale despite the fact that there is nothing in the earlier
cases applying that rationale which would suggest that it
was based upon personal privacy or confidentiality
considerations.
Viewing the visitatorial powers rationale through the
prism of personal privacy also permitted Justice Marshall to
link that doctrine to the White test,' which the Court had
adopted when the visitatorial powers rationale proved
inadequate to address the law enforcement needs that
subsequent cases presented to the Court.'32 Justice Marshall
did so by treating the state's right of access to corporate
books and records under the visitatorial powers rationale as
the equivalent of the right of access to partnership records by
130 Id. at 92.
131 See supra note 110 (quoting the White test articulated in United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944), as whether one can fairly say
under all the circumstances that "a particular type of organization has a
character so impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that
it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal
interest of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group
interests only.").
132 See supra notes 100-14 (discussing the adoption of the White test
and the abandonment of the visitatorial power rationale for the collective
entity doctrine).
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other partners in a partnership.133 In both instances, he
reasoned, the privacy interest of any individual member or
partner is insufficient to support invocation of the privilege
against self-incrimination, so long as the group or
partnership is "an organization which is recognized as an
independent entity apart from its individual members.""'
Applying the White test in this manner, it was easy to
conclude that "large, impersonal, highly structured
enterprises of essentially perpetual duration," 5 such as
"Wall Street law firms and stock brokerage firms,"'36 did not
qualify for the protection of the privilege against self-
incrimination.' As in its prior opinions, however, the real
reason for the Court's reluctance to allow invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination crept through-the
concern that any other outcome would impede to an
unacceptable degree law enforcement efforts directed at
business entities.38
The remaining challenge facing Justice Marshall was the
potential distinction between "large, impersonal, highly
structured" partnerships and the small, three-person law
partnership before the Court in the Bellis case. As noted
above, the opinion acknowledges that the facts of the case
required the Court "to explore the outer limits of the analysis
of the Court in White."'39 Despite the small size of the Bellis
partnership, the Court concluded that its formality, its
'33 See 417 U.S. at 92-94.
'34 Id. at 92.
135 Id. at 93-94.
136 Id. at 93.
137 Id. at 94.
138 See id. ("It is inconceivable that a brokerage house with offices from
coast to coast handling millions of dollars of investment transactions
annually should be entitled to immunize its records from SEC scrutiny
solely because it operates as a partnership rather than in the corporate
form."). See also supra notes 41-42 (discussing the law enforcement
rationale underlying the Hale case), notes 98-99 (discussing the law
enforcement rationale underlying the Wilson case), and notes 106-10
(discussing the law enforcement rationale underlying the White case).
139 See 417 U.S. at 94.
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relatively long life (fifteen years), and the organizational
structure imposed upon it by state law"' supported the
conclusion that it had "an established institutional identity
independent of its individual partners."4' The Court found
these considerations sufficient to support the conclusion that
the partnership entity could not assert a Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, even though it did not
meet the White test of "a character so impersonal in the
scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be said
to embody or represent the purely private or personal
interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their
common or group interests only."'4 The White test was
essentially dismissed by the Court as "not particularly
helpful in the broad range of cases,"'' and a more flexible
case-by-case approach"' was adopted. The net result was
140 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas exposed a weakness in
the majority's reliance on state partnership law-the law of Pennsylvania,
which governed the Bellis partnership, explicitly provided that a general
partnership of the kind at issue in the case "is treated as an aggregate of
individuals and not as a separate entity." 417 U.S. at 103 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting, quoting Tax Review Board v. Shapiro Co., 409 Pa. 253, 260,
185 A.2d 529, 533 (1962)). The response to this point appears to be in
footnote 7 of the Bellis majority opinion, where after acknowledging that
"state and federal law do not treat partnerships as distinct entities for all
purposes," the Court indulges in a bit of circular reasoning and cites the
White opinion to support the conclusion that "[tihe fact that partnerships
are not viewed solely as entities is immaterial for this purpose." 417 U.S.
at 97 n.7 (citing United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 697 (1944)). For
further discussion of Bellis and the "aggregate vs. entity" theories of
partnership law, as well as those theories' relevance to the collective entity
doctrine, see infra Part V.C.2 at notes 322-336 and accompanying text.
141 417 U.S. at 95.
1 See id. at 100 (citing White, 322 U.S. at 701). The Court did leave
itself a small measure of latitude for deciding future cases, noting in the
concluding paragraph of the majority opinion that a different result might
be appropriate in a case involving a "small family partnership or. .. some
other pre-existing relationship of confidentiality among the partners." See
id. at 101.
143 Id. at 100.
14 The majority's movement toward a case-by-case approach, rather
than a defined test of general application as articulated by the prior White
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abandonment by the Court of both the White test and the
visitatorial powers rationale that had preceded the White
test. The resulting lack of a principled basis for determining
when the Fifth Amendment privilege could be asserted laid
the groundwork for an even more dramatic curtailment of
the availability of the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination.
C. The Ultimate Expansion of the Collective Entity
Doctrine: Braswell and the Application of the
Doctrine to a Wholly Owned Firm
The Bellis Court's application of the collective entity
doctrine to a three-person law partnership made clear that
neither an organization's small size nor its members'
expectations of confidentiality with respect to the
organization's records precluded compelled production of
those records in response to a government subpoena. That
lesson was reinforced a little over a decade later, when the
Court relied upon Bellis to apply the collective entity
doctrine to a wholly owned corporation. In Braswell v.
United States145 a federal grand jury issued a subpoena to
Randy Braswell for production of the books and records of
two corporations.' Braswell was the owner and sole
shareholder of the two corporations.'47 Before forming the
corporations, he had operated his business as a sole
proprietorship.4 4 The other two directors of the corporations
were Braswell's wife and his mother, but neither of them had
any authority over the business of the corporations.'49
Despite these factors, a narrow five-four majority of the
opinion, is evidenced by the final paragraph of the majority opinion,
discussed supra note 142 in which a case-by-case analysis for the future is
endorsed. See id. at 101.
145 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
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Court... concluded that the collective entity doctrine
precluded Braswell from asserting a Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination in response to the
subpoena for the corporate records, even though he was
named personally as the recipient of the subpoena."'
1. The Implied Waiver Aspect of Braswell
Braswell did not attempt to challenge the application of
the collective entity doctrine to his wholly owned firm.'
Instead, he argued that his compelled production of the
subpoenaed corporate documents "would incriminate him
"'o In addition to the five-four split among the Justices, the difficult
nature of the issues presented by the Braswell case is evidenced by the fact
that the Justices did not divide along the usual ideological lines. The four
dissenters in Braswell were Justices Kennedy (who wrote the dissenting
opinion), Brennan, Marshall, and Scalia-four Justices who did not often
see eye-to-eye on issues before the Court. Their joining together in a
particularly strong condemnation of Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion, see 487 U.S. at 130 (describing the majority's holding as "factually
unsound, unnecessary for legitimate regulation, and a violation of the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution"),
demonstrate that the case presented unusually challenging constitutional
issues.
'5' The Braswell majority opinion seems to recognize some significance
in the fact that Braswell was named personally in the grand jury subpoena
and required to appear and produce the subpoenaed documents. The
majority interpreted the Fisher act of production doctrine, see infra Part
III.B, as requiring that the government make no evidentiary use of the
individual's act of production. See 487 U.S. at 117-18. See generally Cole,
New Protection, supra note 17 (analyzing the current state of the law
under the act of production doctrine). The dissenters, in contrast, seized
upon this concession as evidence that the majority's decision impinged
upon rights protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination-the only available grounds for limiting admissibility of the
individual's act of producing the subpoenaed documents. See 487 U.S. at
128. The significance of this difference in view as to the protection
afforded by the act of production doctrine and the Court's new, post-Fisher
interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause is discussed in more detail
infra at Part III.
152 487 U.S. at 102 ("[Pletitioner asserts no self-incrimination claim on
behalf of the corporations; it is well established that such artificial entities
are not protected by the Fifth Amendment.").
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individually." '153 Although the focus of the Court's opinion
therefore was on whether or not Braswell could assert an
individual self-incrimination claim in response to the
corporate subpoenas, Chief Justice Rehnquist nonetheless
began his analysis with a spirited defense of the collective
entity doctrine. He observed at the outset that "[hiad
[Braswell] conducted his business as a sole proprietorship,"
he would have been able to assert the privilege against self-
incrimination in response to the subpoenas for his business
records.15'
2. Law Enforcement Interests Again Trump
Protection of Constitutional Rights
Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to defend the collective
entity doctrine as having a "lengthy and distinguished
pedigree"'55 and to caution that curtailment of the doctrine
would "have a detrimental impact on the Government's
efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most
serious problems confronting law enforcement authorities."
56
All of these assertions, including the implicit assumption
that a choice of the business form by which one conducts his
or her business can effectively waive a constitutional right,'57
are open to challenge.
As the discussion above demonstrates, the history of the
collective entity doctrine may be long, but it is hardly
distinguished. Instead, it is marked by shifting rationales,
abandonment of no-longer-adequate conceptual
153 Id. at 103. The act of production doctrine upon which Braswell was
relying is discussed infra at Part III.
154 Id. at 104. Under post-Fisher self-incrimination doctrine, the
privilege would only apply if Braswell could "show that his act of
production [of the subpoenaed business records] would entail testimonial
self-incrimination." See infra at Part III.B for detailed discussion of the
act of production doctrine. See generally Cole, New Protection, supra note
17 (analyzing the current state of the law under the act of production
doctrine).
155 487 U.S. at 104.
156 Id. at 115 (citation omitted).
157 See infra Part IV.D.
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underpinnings, and blatantly result-oriented analysis,
largely prompted by the Court's concerns about interfering
unduly with law enforcement efforts if it applied a Boyd-
based, pre-Fisher conception of the privilege against self-
incrimination to business records.' In Braswell a narrow,
five-four majority of the Court chose to cling to a poorly
conceived and now outmoded legal doctrine that
unnecessarily compromises the constitutional rights of
American business people, and in so doing missed the
opportunity to rationalize Fifth Amendment law while at the
same time bringing it into step with modern business
practice. 9 Understanding the nature and magnitude of this
missed opportunity requires examination of three separate
areas of law that have been subject to significant new
developments over the past quarter of a century: (1) the new
theory of Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination law that the Court adopted in its 1976 opinion
in Fisher v. United States and has since reaffirmed in
1 8 Professor Henning has aptly summarized the Court's collective
entity cases as follows: "The invariable, and even expansive, denial of the
privilege against self-incrimination for a variety of organizations,
including a single-shareholder corporation, shows that the Court is not
willing to allow the government's enforcement program to be adversely
affected by permitting any corporate claim of the privilege." Henning,
Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 861.
159 Professor Henning views the holding in Braswell differently.
Focusing on the limitations the Braswell court imposed upon any effort by
the prosecution to make evidentiary use of an individual custodian's act of
production on behalf of the corporation in a subsequent prosecution of the
individual custodian, see 487 U.S. at 118, Professor Henning concludes
that "[b]y providing explicit protection to the individual, the [Braswell]
Court negated some of the effect of denying the privilege to corporations
without having to reconsider the balance it struck in Hale v. Henkel in
barring a corporation from refusing to produce documents." See Henning,
Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 829. Professor Henning
concedes, however, that "[tihe Court did not explain the constitutional
basis for this restriction on the government." Id. at 829 n.159. While this
aspect of the Braswell holding may well mitigate the extent to which it
denies a constitutional right to targets of criminal prosecution, it also
underscores the unprincipled and result-oriented character of the Court's
analytical approach in the collective entity cases.
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subsequent cases; (2) the major changes that have taken
place in the law of organizational criminal liability in the
last quarter of the twentieth century; and (3) the rapid
proliferation and broad adoption of new forms of business
organizations that have transformed the legal landscape of
the business sector. Each of those areas of significant
developments in the law is discussed below.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FIFTH
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE AND THEIR
RELEVANCE TO THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY
DOCTRINE
A. Nineteenth-Century Antecedents: Foundations of a
Flawed Doctrine
As discussed in Part II above, 6 ' at the time the Supreme
Court decided the Hale v. Henkel 6' case and first embraced
the concept that corporations and natural persons should be
treated differently for Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination purposes, applying the then-governing
conceptions of the protections provided by the Fifth
Amendment privilege to corporations arguably would have
posed a serious threat to law enforcement interests. First,
and probably most significant to the Court's reasoning in
Hale, if the contents.6 of business records were subject to
Fifth Amendment protection and the production of those
records therefore could not be compelled by subpoena or
other judicial process absent a grant of transactional'
immunity, as the Boyd case at the time dictated, then in
many cases law enforcement officials would have found it
160 See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
161 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
162 See infra Part III.B, discussing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391 (1976), and the distinction between the contents of pre-existing
documents and the act of production of those documents.
163 See infra Part III.B.2, discussing Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441 (1972), and the distinction between transactional and use
immunity.
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difficult to collect evidence necessary to investigate and
prosecute corporate crime."' This concern appears to have
been a motivating factor for the Hale decision and has since
emerged as the driving force behind the development of the
collective entity doctrine, 6 ' as evidenced by then-Justice
Rehnquist's somewhat histrionic assertion in Braswell that
permitting corporations to assert a privilege against self-
incrimination would make effective enforcement of many
laws "impossible."16 While such an assertion may have had
some validity at the beginning of the twentieth century when
Hale was decided, for reasons that are described below it
clearly was no longer well-founded at the time Braswell was
decided. Before exploring why that is the case, it is
worthwhile to consider a second, less explicitly recognized
concern that may have influenced the Court to deny
corporations a right against self-incrimination.
Another then-governing but since-abandoned
167
constitutional law doctrine--the conception that full
164 See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
165 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. See also Scott A.
Trainor, Note, A Comparative Analysis Of A Corporation's Right Against
Self-Incrimination, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2139, 2170 & n.247 (1995) ("The
Court has also placed increased reliance on the adverse effect that
allowing a corporate right against self-incrimination would have on the
state's police powers."). Cf. Amar & Lettow, supra note 34, at 884 (noting
that "Boyd and its immediate progeny involved corporate crime and
breaches of regulatory requirements").
166 See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 (1988) ("The
greater portion of the evidence of wrongdoing by an organization or its
representatives is usually found in the official records and documents of
that organization. Were the cloak of the privilege to be thrown around
these impersonal records and documents, effective enforcement of many
federal and state laws would be impossible."). Cf. generally Stuntz,
Substantive Origins, supra note 51, at 421-22 ('Through Boyd and
subsequent decisions [in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries], the Supreme Court adopted a view of the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments that might have made a great deal of economic regulation
constitutionally impossible at the federal level.").
167 See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note 34, at 858 (noting that in 1972
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), "in effect overruled" the
transactional immunity rule of Counselman v. United States, 142 U.S. 547
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"transactional" immunity was necessary to overcome the
protections of the privilege against self-incrimination-may
have contributed to the Hale Court's refusal to permit
corporations to assert a privilege against self-incrimination.
A few years before its 1906 decision in Hale, the Supreme
Court had held in Counselman v. United States68 that only a
grant of complete "transactional" immunity was
constitutionally sufficient to overcome an assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination and compel a witness to
testify.'69 Coupled with the Boyd rule that the privilege
applied to the contents of pre-existing business records,
Counselman would have presented a huge obstacle to
prosecuting a corporation in any case, such as the antitrust
investigation in Hale, in which the business records of the
target corporation were essential to the prosecution. "' Such
a result obviously militated strongly against applying the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to
corporations, 7' and makes the Court's ruling in Hale, and in
(1892), and "established a new, narrower rule of 'use plus use-fruits
immunity'").
168 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
169 Id. See also Amar & Lettow, supra note 34.
170 Cf. id. at 870-71 (positing that the Counselman rule of "complete
immunity from prosecution for the crime" that was in effect at the time
may have influenced the Supreme Court's adoption of the "required
records" exception in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948)).
171 Other commentators have recognized this point. See, e.g., Michael
Goldsmith & Chad W. King, Policing Corporate Crime: The Dilemma of
Internal Compliance Programs, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1, 43-44 (1997) (stating
transaction immunity would produce "windfall protections" if offered as an
incentive for greater corporate internal compliance programs (citing
Kastigar)); William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1052 (1995) [hereinafter Stuntz,
Privacy's Problem] ("Government regulation required lots of information,
and Boyd came dangerously close to giving regulated actors a blanket
entitlement to nondisclosure. It is hard to see how modern health, safety,
environmental, or economic regulation would be possible in such a
regime."); Stuntz, Substantive Origins, supra note 51, at 427-28 (observing
that if the Boyd conception of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination had been applied to corporations "the modern regulatory
state would have been dead almost before it was born"); Mitchell Lewis
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particular the Hale majority's grasping for the visitatorial
power rationale,172 understandable when viewed in historical
context.173
B. Late Twentieth-Century Developments: Erosion of
the Foundations of the Collective Entity Doctrine
In the late twentieth century the Supreme Court
redefined the meaning of the Fifth Amendment in two major
ways that, taken together, largely obliterated the conceptual
foundation upon which the collective entity doctrine had
been built. The most fundamental of these was the Court's
1976 bombshell 174 announcement in Fisher v. United States
17 5
of a new conception of the manner in which the Fifth
Amendment applies to documents. Fisher held that the
contents of voluntarily created preexisting documents are not
subject to the Self-Incrimination Clause, no matter how
incriminating the contents may be to their creator, because
their creation was not "compelled" within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment.' Although Fisher retained Self-
Rothman, Life After Doe? Self-Incrimination And Business Documents, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 387, 402-03 (1987) (discussing Congress' reaction to the
Counselman ruling and stating that corporate criminal prosecutions would
be hindered due to Fifth Amendment claims).
172 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
173 See infra Part III.B.2 for further discussion of the influence of
Counselman on the collective entity doctrine. See also Neville S. Hedley,
Comment, Who Will Produce Corporate Documents? Case Comment of In re
John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 30 NEw ENG. L. REV. 141, 142-61
(1995) (discussing the evolution of the collective entity doctrine); Henning,
Finding What Was Lost, supra note 33, at 415-19 (outlining the
development of the collective entity doctrine).
174 For analysis of the significance of the Fisher decision see Cole, New
Protection, supra note 17, at 123 n.1 (2002) (describing Fisher as a
"bombshell" dropped on the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and collecting authorities on the significance of the Fisher
decision).
175 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
176 See Cole, New Protection, supra note 17, at 126. See also Robert P.
Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors and Subpoenas for Incriminating Evidence:
The Consequences and Correction of Excess, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487,
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Incrimination Clause protection for the act of production of
documents when the act of production has communicative
aspects separate and apart from the contents of documents, 77
its practical effect was to make the Self-Incrimination Clause
inapplicable to most document productions.'
1. The Implications of Fisher for the Collective
Entity Doctrine
By confining the application of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination to the act of production,
rather than the contents, of documents subject to subpoena,
Fisher as a practical matter eliminated the underlying
rationale of Hale v. Henkel and the collective entity cases-
that permitting corporations and other collective entities to
assert a privilege against self-incrimination would unduly
interfere with law enforcement by making essential
documents and business records unavailable to investigators
and prosecutors.' The significance of this conceptual
change becomes apparent when one considers the limited
manner in which the Fifth Amendment would now apply to
business entities had the Supreme Court not developed the
collective entity doctrine to preclude its application to such
entities. By definition an inanimate collective entity-
504 (2001) (citing Fisher for the proposition that "[uinder the modem
Supreme Court's understanding of the Fifth Amendment, prosecutorial
use of documents that were prepared voluntarily does not itself violate the
Constitution"); Nagareda, supra note 29, at 1590-1603 (criticizing Fisher's
decoupling the contents of documents from the act of production of
documents).
177 See Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. See also Cole, New Protection, supra
note 17, at 146-47; Nagareda, supra note 29, at 1590-94.
171 See Cole, New Protection, supra note 17, at 126-31. See also
Henning, Testing the Limits, supra note 35, at 421 (discussing the
practical limitations on the application of the act of production doctrine to
most document subpoenas).
179 Cf. Alito, supra note 49, at 69 (noting that "[tihe net effect of Fisher
and Doe was to destroy part of the foundations of the old rules regarding
subpoenas for institutional records, while leaving the remainder of their
foundations intact").
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whether a corporation, a partnership, a labor union, or a
limited liability company--cannot itself provide oral
testimony subject to a privilege against self-incrimination
claim; the privilege's only potential application to such
entities is through the production of documents and records.
If the contents of those documents and records are not
subject to a Fifth Amendment claim, as has been the case
since Fisher rewrote the rules by which the Fifth
Amendment is applied to documents, 80 then the primary
rationale for the collective entity doctrine no longer exists.'
While the act of production doctrine continues to provide
some narrow-and probably largely theoretical"'8 -basis for
application of the Fifth Amendment to collective entities, it is
far from clear that it provides an adequate foundation to
support retaining the collective entity doctrine.'83 Moreover,
even that limited foundation has been largely blasted away
by the Court's other major late twentieth-century
reconceptualization of Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination law-Kastigar v. United States' and the
acceptance of use and derivative use immunity as adequate
180 Justice Kennedy recognized this point in his dissenting opinion in
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 125 (1988) (noting that "no one may
claim a [Fifth Amendment] privilege with respect to the contents of
business records not created by compulsion").
181 A variation on this argument was presented to the Supreme Court
in Braswell, of course, and the Court declined to reexamine the continued
vitality of the collective entity doctrine in light of Fisher. See Braswell,
487 U.S. at 113 (concluding that "the lesson of Fisher is clear: A custodian
may not resist a subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment
grounds"). See also supra notes 156-160 (summarizing the collective entity
analysis in Braswell) and infra notes 284-307 (arguing that subsequent
developments in business entity law justify revisiting Braswell's holding).
182 See infra Part V for further discussion of the application of the act
of production doctrine to business entities.
183 See generally Robert Bouvilier Foster, Comment, The Right Against
Self-Incrimination by Producing Documents: Rethinking the Representative
Capacity Doctrine, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1605, 1635 (1986) (discussing the use
of act of production immunity to obtain documents from a collective
entity).
184 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
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to overcome an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. 5
2. The Implications of Kastigar for the Collective
Entity Doctrine
When Hale v. Henkel was decided and throughout the
subsequent decades in which the collective entity doctrine
was developing,'86 the grant of immunity necessary to
overcome an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination was full immunity from
prosecution for any of the matters about which testimony
was provided-full "transactional" or "true" immunity.
That conception of the protection against self-incrimination
provided by the Fifth Amendment had been firmly ensconced
in constitutional law since the Supreme Court's 1892
decision in Counselman v. Hitchcock.' Counselman held
that an immunity statute that provided only "use" immunity
was insufficient to overcome a Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination claim and that only a statute "afford[ing] an
absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offence
to which the question relates" would pass constitutional
muster.9 For almost eighty years after the Counselman
185 As one of the most thoughtful commentators on Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination law has observed, "[Wihile legal rules are often
complicated, the application of the Fifth Amendment and use immunity to
the act of producing documents ... is particularly esoteric." Mosteller,
supra note 176, at 489. The discussion of use immunity that follows was
not intended to prove this point, although that may well be its unintended
consequence.
186 See supra Parts II.A and B.
187 See H. Richard Uviller, Foreword: Fisher Goes on the Quintessential
Fishing Expedition and Hubbell is Off the Hook, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 311, 327 (2001) (discussing the distinction between "old-
fashioned 'transactional,' or 'true,' immunity" and "so-called 'use
immunity').
188 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
189 Id. at 585-86. See generally Amar & Lettow, supra note 34, at 875-
76 (describing the "extraordinarily sweeping form of immunity" required
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decision, federal' 90 immunity statutes provided for full,
transactional immunity."'
This transactional immunity requirement was an implicit
foundational underpinning of the collective entity doctrine
during its development in the early- and mid-twentieth
century.' 92 So long as a grant of full, transactional immunity
would be required in the federal criminal justice system93 to
overcome an assertion of privilege by a business entity, the
Court was forced to find ways' to avoid permitting business
entities to assert the privilege in order to avoid stymieing
their successful prosecution in federal courts. If documents
or records essential to a successful prosecution were in the
custody and control of a business entity, and if that business
entity could assert a Fifth Amendment privilege with respect
to those documents or records, and if a grant of transactional
immunity to the entity was the only means of overcoming its
assertion of privilege, then as a practical matter it would be
impossible to prosecute the entity.'95  Under that legal
by Counselman); Kenneth J. Melilli, Act of Production Immunity, 52 OHIo
ST. L.J. 223, 225-26 (1991) (analyzing Counselman).
190 Counselman's holding applied only to federal prosecutions, of
course, because at that time the Fifth Amendment had yet to be applied to
the states through incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment. See
generally Amar & Lettow, supra note 34, at 876 (discussing incorporation).
191 Melilli, supra note 189, at 225 n.20 (collecting authorities).
192 See supra notes 163-167.
193 See supra note 55 for a discussion of Counselman's application to
federal cases prior to the Court's "incorporation" of the Fifth Amendment
in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
194 See supra Part II.B for a critique of the ways in which the Court
strained to find rationales to perpetuate and expand the collective entity
doctrine.
195 Cf. Goldsmith & King, supra note 171, at 43-44 (stating that
offering transactional immunity as an incentive for greater corporate
internal compliance programs would produce "windfall protections" (citing
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448-53 (1972)); Rothman, supra
note 171, at 402-03 (discussing Congress' reaction to the Counselman
ruling and stating corporate criminal prosecutions would be hindered due
to Fifth Amendment claims); Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 171, at
1052 ("Government regulation required lots of information, and Boyd came
dangerously close to giving regulated actors a blanket entitlement to
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regime, development of the collective entity was a practical
necessity, no matter how unprincipled it may have been as a
matter of constitutional theory.'96
The Supreme Court's 1972 decision in Kastigar v. United
States removed this practical necessity. Kastigar held that a
grant of use and derivative use immunity197 was sufficient to
overcome an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination-full transactional immunity was
no longer required.9 In the enormously important area of
immunity law, Kastigar was every bit as revolutionary a
holding as Fisher. It fundamentally changed the options
available to the government when confronted with an
assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. More important for purposes of the collective
nondisclosure. It is hard to see how modem health, safety, environmental,
or economic regulation would be possible in such a regime."); Stuntz,
Substantive Origins, supra note 51, at 427-28 (observing that if the Boyd
conception of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
had been applied to corporations, "the modem regulatory state would have
been dead almost before it was born").
196 See supra notes 161-167 and accompanying text. See also Foster,
supra note 183, at 1633 (observing that "[t]he law enforcement rationale is
inherently suspect" because "[clonsistently acceding to the needs of law
enforcement would destroy the privilege against self-incrimination
entirely").
197 Some courts and commentators prefer the term "use plus use-fruits
immunity" immunity because it is "more graphic" and therefore arguably
better provides a shorthand explanation of the scope of the immunity. See
Amar & Lettow, supra note 34, at 877-78 n.82 (describing this distinction
and collecting authorities).
198 Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453-55. For a detailed analysis of immunity
law and the Supreme Court's Counselman and Kastigar decisions, see
Melilli, supra note 189, at 223-34. In endorsing use and derivative use
immunity as sufficient to overcome an assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the Kastigar Court went so far as to say that the
transactional immunity required by Counselman grants a witness
"considerably broader protection than does the Fifth Amendment
privilege." 406 U.S. at 453. This observation is telling because it explains
why the Court, in developing and expanding the collective entity doctrine,
was forced to find ways to circumvent Counselman's broad conception of
the protection provided by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
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entity doctrine, it makes it possible for investigators and
prosecutors to compel a business entity to produce
documents and records without granting full transactional
immunity to the entity, thus leaving open the option of
subsequently prosecuting that entity. 99
3. The Combined Effect of Fisher and Kastigar
With respect to the conceptual underpinnings of the
collective entity doctrine, the combined effect of the Fisher
and Kastigar holdings is dramatic."0 Put simply, if the
contents of preexisting entity documents are never
privileged, and if the entity's act of production can be
immunized without necessarily precluding a subsequent
prosecution of the entity using the contents of those
documents, then the underlying concerns that motivated the
Court in its pre-Braswell collective entity cases have been
substantially ameliorated, and the doctrine is therefore ripe
for re-examination.
199 The following issues attendant to such prosecutions remain
unsettled even after Fisher and Kastigar: (1) when can an act of production
privilege be asserted as to documents and records such that use and
derivative use immunity must be granted to overcome that assertion of
privilege; and (2) once use and derivative use immunity has been granted
for the act of producing documents and records, what derivative use can be
made of those documents and records and their contents in a subsequent
prosecution. See infra Part V for a discussion of these two extraordinarily
difficult issues in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
200 For an analysis of the relationship between the act of production
doctrine and grants of immunity from prosecution, see Melilli, supra note
189, at 265 (concluding that "[tihe intersection of the doctrines of
use/derivative use immunity and the act-of-production privilege produces
an uneasy synthesis, especially in defining the scope of derivative use"). It
should be noted that Professor Melilli's article was written before the
Supreme Court addressed the derivative use issue in United States v.
Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000), discussed infra Part III.C.
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C. The Collective Entity Doctrine in the Twenty-First
Century: An Unsupported and Unnecessary Edifice
As two influential commentators observed some ten years
ago, "[t]he Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment is currently in a jumbled transitional phase." 1
If anything, the intervening years have added to the jumbled
and confused state of the law in this area."2 The Court's
2000 decision in United States v. Hubbell °. raises as many
questions as it answers,2"4 and the rapid proliferation of new
business entities in the last ten years,2 5 combined with the
explosion of corporate criminal prosecutions 206 has both
raised the stakes and muddied the waters in this already
complex and confused area of law.
201 Amar & Lettow, supra note 34, at 858 (proposing a new paradigm
for application of the Fifth Amendment in which testimony can always be
compelled from a witness but the fruits of compelled testimony cannot be
used to prosecute the witness). Amar and Lettow also note that with
respect to the difficult question of what it means to be a "witness" against
oneself for Fifth Amendment purposes, "the courts have been all over the
map." Id. at 883.
202 See generally Ronald J. Allen & M. Kristin Mace, The Self-
Incrimination Clause Explained and Its Future Predicted, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 243, 244 (2004) (observing that "the theoretical foundations
of the Fifth Amendment are conventionally thought to be in disarray);
Mosteller, supra note 176, at 503 (describing the Fisher act of production
doctrine as "arcane and complicated"). See also United States v. Hubbell,
167 F.3d 552, 570 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (describing the application of the Fifth
Amendment to documentary evidence as an "admittedly abstract and
under-determined area of the law").
203 530 U.S. 27 (2000).
204 See generally Cole, New Protection, supra note 17. See also Allen &
Mace, supra note 202 (analyzing the ambiguities created by Hubbell and
predicting how act of production law may evolve in the future); Mosteller,
supra note 176, at 519-47 (analyzing the implications of Hubbell); Uviller,
supra note 187 (criticizing the holding of Hubbell).
205 See generally Robert W. Hamilton, Closely-Held Business
Symposium: The Uniform Limited Partnership Act: Entity Proliferation, 37
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 859 (2004).
206 See infra part TV.C.
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1. The Hubbell Decision Complicates Matters
Further
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hubbell, one
could have argued with some force and conviction-as did
the Office of Independent Counsel and the Department of
Justice in that case2 7-that the Fifth Amendment no longer
applied to voluntarily created "ordinary business records."
After Hubbell, the law is more complicated because the act of
production doctrine as applied by the Supreme Court in that
case is broader and encompasses more testimonial
components than most had previously believed."8 Although
207 See Brief for OIC at 33-34, United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27
(2000) (No. 99-166) (arguing that because the subpoena in Hubbell, like
the subpoena in Fisher, "called only for specified categories of ordinary
business records, the decision in Fisher calls for the same conclusion here:
The subpoena compelled respondent to make no communication that rises
to the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment").
The Department of Justice brief argued that:
Fisher's 'foregone conclusion' test focuses on broader
categories of documents, and not on the individual
documents that may fall within the specifications of a
subpoena. As applied to an individual who is or was
engaged in business, the test would therefore defeat any
effort to invoke the Fifth Amendment to resist compliance
with a subpoena for ordinary business records, such as
ledgers, bank records, invoices, receipts, and bills. Such
documents are kept by every business, and conceding their
existence therefore "adds little or nothing to the sum total
of the Government's information."
Brief for DOJ at 29-30, United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27 (2000) (No.
99-166) (internal footnote and citation omitted). See also Mosteller, supra
note 176, at 511 (noting that Hubbell rejected the government's argument
that it "needed only to know that typically businessmen have documents in
certain broad classes, such as general business and tax records").
201 See Cole, New Protection, supra note 17, at 190-91 (analyzing the
effect of Hubbell). See also Allen & Mace, supra note 202, at 248 ("In
Hubbell, by inflating derivative use immunity to previously unseen
proportions, the Court expanded the scope of protection."); Mosteller,
supra note 176, at 492-93 ("[Tjhe Hubbell case may have completely
reformulated the law of subpoenaing and using items from targets.");
Uviller, supra note 187, at 312 ("What drew my attention to the Hubbell
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the level of influence Hubbell will ultimately prove to have
on Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination law
is an important and fascinating inquiry, it is not the focus of
this Article."9 Instead, this Article focuses on the collective
entity doctrine, and Hubbell's influence on this more discrete
area of Fifth Amendment law is considerably easier to
analyze and predict. In this regard, it is important to
recognize two critical aspects of the factual situation
presented to the Court in Hubbell.21°
2. The Limits of Hubbell's Effect on the Collective
Entity Doctrine
First, Webster Hubbell was operating his consulting
business as a sole proprietorship,"' and therefore the
collective entity doctrine had no direct application to his
case. Second, Hubbell was an exceptional case even by white
collar criminal prosecution standards because in pursuing
decision was the fact that my clear understanding of the Fisher doctrine is
exactly what was rejected by the Supreme Court, and by the nearly
unanimous vote of 8-1."). Professor Mosteller provides an insightful
analysis of the tactical missteps and questionable prosecutorial judgments
by the Office of Independent Counsel in the Hubbell case which resulted in
a Supreme Court decision that "badly damaged the value to prosecutors of
use immunity for documentary subpoenas, likely altered the environment
in the lower courts as to documentary subpoenas for years to come, and
prompted the Court to condemn these inquisitorial excesses through
language that broadly paints the Fifth Amendment protection ... [and]
did substantial immediate and long-term damage to prosecutorial
interests." Mosteller, supra note 176, at 503.
209 For this author's answer to that question, see Cole, New Protection,
supra note 17, at 191. For the answers of other commentators, see Allen &
Mace, supra note 202; Mosteller, supra note 176, at 519-47; Uviller, supra
note 187.
210 It is also important to recognize that the Supreme Court's cases in
this area "repeatedly have included statements that categorical answers
are inappropriate," see Mosteller, supra note 176, at 489, and therefore it
is difficult to predict their application to subsequent cases involving
different fact patterns.
211 See generally United States v. Hubbell, 167 F.3d 552, 563 (1999),
aff'd 530 U.S. 27 (2000) (describing Hubbell's production of responsive
documents pursuant to a grant of use and derivative use immunity).
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Mr. Hubbell the Office of Independent Counsel had
embarked upon a "fishing expedition"1 2 to try to confirm a
suspicion about Mr. Hubbell in what many believe was a
politically motivated investigation.213  In more typical
business crime investigations 2 4 the prosecutors are likely to
have more information about specific criminal conduct that
they have reason to believe has occurred 215 and are likely to
have access to a good deal of information about that conduct
(from business associates, employees, counterparties to
transactions-some of whom typically will have been
immunized and provided extensive grand jury testimony-as
well as public records and filings, etc.), which will make it
212 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. at 42 (2000) ("What the
District Court characterized as a 'fishing expedition' did produce a fish,
but not the one that the Independent Counsel expected to hook."). See also
United States v. Hubbell, 11 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C. 1998) ("The
subpoena served on Mr. Hubbell was the quintessential fishing
expedition."), rev'd, vacated by 167 F.3d 552 (1999), affd 530 U.S. 27
(2000).
213 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr's
OIC and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 639 (1999). Cf.
Mosteller, supra note 176, at 492 (discussing Starr's "OIC's recklessness in
its myopic pursuit of the President and First Lady and the negative impact
on long-term prosecutorial interests"). Professor Mosteller aptly
summarized the Independent Counsel's actions as follows: "Without
particular knowledge of any crime, the OIC had subpoenaed from Hubbell
virtually all of his business related documents under a grant of use
immunity. The OIC sorted through those documents, discovered a crime,
and then prosecuted Hubbell based on evidence it obtained from the
documents secured through a grant of immunity." Mosteller, supra note
176, at 523.
214 For a more detailed analysis of the unusual circumstances of the
OIC's actions in the Hubbell case, see Mosteller, supra note 176, at 498 &
n.49 (2001) (discussing the "unprecedented" nature of the OIC's decision to
prosecute Hubbell after granting him immunity at the outset of its
investigation").
215 And, in fact, prosecutors will seldom have either the inclination or
the resources to engage in "fishing expeditions" without substantial
evidence of specific criminal conduct. Cf id. at 501 ("Hubbell was being
prosecuted for crimes of which the government had no knowledge or even
concrete suspicions until Hubbell himself provided his personal business
records.").
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much easier for them to demonstrate the level of knowledge
required after Hubbell (whatever that may be) to overcome
the Fisher "foregone conclusion" test.216 For these reasons,
Hubbell is not likely to have a significant impact on most
cases involving prosecution of a collective business entity.
Because Webster Hubbell was operating his business as a
sole proprietorship, the Supreme Court could decide the
Hubbell case without revisiting its closely divided decision in
Braswell v. United States217 and could thereby continue to
uphold the collective entity doctrine. This is unfortunate,
because had the Court revisited the collective entity doctrine
in the context of its Hubbell decision, it might have
recognized the extent to which the always weak conceptual
underpinnings of Braswell had been further eroded since
that case was decided. The five-Justice Braswell majority21
was concerned that permitting custodians of corporate
records to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege "would have a
detrimental impact on the Government's efforts to prosecute
'white-collar crime,' one of the most serious problems
confronting law enforcement authorities."219 For the reasons
that are discussed above,22 this concern is no longer well-
founded and clearly does not rise to the level of importance
that the overheated rhetoric of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
majority opinion in Braswell suggests. The consequences of
the Braswell majority's stubborn adherence to the collective
216 See id. at 498 (noting that "if enough information existed to
establish that existence and possession were 'foregone conclusions,'
Hubbell's Fifth Amendment claim would have been eliminated") (citations
omitted).
217 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
218 Braswell was a five-four decision that did not break down between
the usual "conservative" and "liberal" wings of the Court with respect to
members of the majority (Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, Stevens, and
O'Connor) and the dissenters (Brennan, Marshall, Scalia, and Kennedy).
The unusual ideological bedfellows in those two groups may be an
indicator of the difficulty of the issues before the Court and the resistance
of those issues to easy resolution along typical ideological lines.
219 487 U.S. at 115 (citation reference omitted).
120 See supra Part III.
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entity doctrine,221 in contrast, have increased dramatically
since that case was decided due to recent developments in
the law of business entity criminal liability. Those
developments, and their relevance to the collective entity
doctrine, are discussed in the next Part of this Article.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ENTITY CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND




The criminal law applicable to business entities has
changed dramatically since the collective entity doctrine was
first announced by the Supreme Court. The extent of this
change is apparent when one considers that at the beginning
of the twentieth century the United States Supreme Court
actually gave serious consideration to the issue of whether a
corporation could be held criminally liable for the acts of its
employees."22 In New York Central & Hudson River Railroad
221 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 109-10 (acknowledging that "the holding
in Fisher-later reaffirmed in Doe-embarked upon a new course of Fifth
Amendment analysis," but declining to hold that "it rendered the collective
entity rule obsolete" or to recognize "a claim of privilege by the
corporation-which of course possesses no such privilege").
222 See New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481 (1909). Professor Baker has written that:
corporations can do none of the actions required of a
virtuous citizen because, as abstract entities, they lack the
mind and will necessary to make the voluntary choices
which distinguish virtue from vice and criminal conduct
from noncriminal. For that reason, corporations could not
be guilty of crimes at common law. When the Supreme
Court departed from the common law rule in New York
Central & Hudson River Railroad Company v. United
States, it upheld a misdemeanor conviction of a corporation
and allowed punishment by a fine, which was long
assumed to be the only way courts could punish a
corporation.
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Company v. United States, the Court acknowledged that the
old common law rule, reported in Blackstone's
Commentaries, was that a corporation could not commit a
crime, but then went on to hold that corporations can be held
criminally liable based on the acts of their agents.223
The Court's decision in New York Central, coupled with
the development of the collective entity doctrine, paved the
way for a steady expansion of business entity criminal
liability throughout the remainder of the twentieth
century.22 ' Application of the collective entity doctrine to
corporations subsequent to the New York Central case is
particularly ironic in light of the fact that "[olne premise of
New York Central was that the law should not treat
corporations differently from individuals."22 With respect to
John S. Baker, Jr., Reforming Corporations Through Threats of Federal
Prosecution, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 310, 318 (2004) (internal citations
omitted).
223 New York Central, 212 U.S. at 494. Professor Henning has noted
that the agency theory employed by the Court in New York Central is
consistent with the Fifth Amendment agency analysis of Hale v. Henkel
because "[a]ccording a separate existence to the corporation for proof of
every element of a crime could raise the organization to the level of a
'person' under the Self-Incrimination Clause, thereby foiling the careful
balancing the Court undertook in Hale v. Henkel." See Henning, Corporate
Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 824.
224 See, e.g., Gilbert Geis & Joseph F.C. DiMento, Empirical Evidence
and the Legal Doctrine of Corporate Criminal Liability, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L.
341 (2002) (discussing the New York Central decision and its role in the
creation of a federal body of law on the subject of corporate criminal
liability); Eliezer Lederman, Criminal Law, Perpetrator and Corporation:
Rethinking a Complex Triangle, 76 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 285, 289-91
(1985) (discussing the New York Central decision and its progeny in
American law). See generally V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability:
What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1477 (1996). For a
succinct analysis of the historical development of English and American
doctrines of corporate criminal liability, see Kathleen F. Brickey,
Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60
WASH. U. L.Q. 393 (1982).
225 Baker, supra note 222, at 318 (citing New York Central, 212 U.S. at
496-97). With regard to the issue of whether corporations should be
treated differently from individuals for purposes of federal criminal law
enforcement, it is noteworthy that the Department of Justice's official
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the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination,
however, the Supreme Court did make such a distinction in
New York Central when it let stand its holding three years
earlier in Hale v. Henkel establishing the collective entity
doctrine.22 One might have expected the Court to reexamine
its then three-year-old decision to deprive corporations of a
Fifth Anendment privilege against self-incrimination after
the New York Central decision provided for greatly expanded
criminal liability of corporations, but it did not do so. For
reasons that are discussed below, the implications of that
doctrinal disconnect continued to grow throughout the
remainder of the twentieth century.227
policy on prosecution of organizations (in both the Clinton and subsequent
Bush administrations) begins with the statement that "[Clorporations
should not be treated leniently because of their artificial nature nor should
they be subject to harsher treatment." See id. at 319 n.65 (citing the
"Holder Memorandum" of the Clinton/Reno Justice Department and the
"Thompson Memorandum" of the Bush/Ashcroft Justice Department).
Professor Baker points out that "the fact that corporations cannot be jailed
means that some differences in punishment are necessary," but questions
whether that necessity justifies "treat[ing] corporations so differently from
individuals" under the sentencing guidelines. Id. at 323-24.
226 See supra notes 37-73 (discussing Hale v. Henkel and the genesis of
the collective entity doctrine). Professor Henning argues that New York
Central's adoption of respondeat superior principles for corporate criminal
liability was "consistent with Hale v. Henkel's treatment of corporate
criminal rights because that theory gave the Court flexibility to determine
the scope of protection for corporate defendants under the Constitution
without simply equating corporations to individuals." See Henning,
Corporate Constitutional Rights, supra note 25, at 797. As noted above,
see supra, note 25, this Article takes a different analytical approach, and
rejects the premise that it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to define
the scope of Bill of Rights protections based upon law enforcement
interests, even when the person seeking their protection is a corporation or
other business entity.
227 Professor Baker has summarized the early twentieth-century
developments as follows:
The regulatory and the police powers came together in, and
expanded from, Champion v. Ames (Lottery Case) in 1903.
Six years later in New York Central & Hudson River
Railroad Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court departed
from the common law view to permit prosecutions of
[Vol. 2005
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B. Mid-Century Developments:
Dramatically Expanded Corporate Criminal
Liability
During the same time period in which the collective
entity doctrine was being refined and applied to new kinds of
entities by the Supreme Court,"' developments in the
substantive criminal law were making it easier for
prosecutors to impose criminal liability on business
entities.229  By the middle of the twentieth century,
corporations and other business entities were being held
criminally liable even for unauthorized actions by corporate
employees and agents, so long as those actions in some way
benefited the corporation.2 ' All the courts required was
some incidental benefit to the corporation; liability could be
imposed on the corporation when agents were acting
corporations. Taken together, these decisions established
the basis for the federal government's regulation and
criminal punishment of corporations. Due to the
constitutional structure of federalism and the continuing
influence of mens rea in criminal law, it was many decades
before the full potential of exerting regulatory control over
private corporations would be realized under the rubric of
"white collar crime."
Baker, supra note 222, at 341 (citations omitted).
22s See supra Part II.A.2.
229 See generally Baker, supra note 222, at 313 (observing that
"Congress's habit of drafting broad statutes, leaving much interpretation
to the Justice Department and federal courts has given federal criminal
law an uncertain and expansive character") (citation omitted); Brickey,
supra note 224 (summarizing history of American and British corporate
criminal liability); Lederman, supra note 224, at 288-93 (describing the
Anglo-American approach); Khanna, supra note 224.
230 See Std. Oil Co. of Tex. v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.
1962) (corporate criminal liability). Cf. SEC v. H.L. Rodger & Bro., 444
F.2d 1077 (7th Cir. 1971) (imputing the knowledge of an agent acting
within the scope of his authority to the partnership). See generally
Lederman, supra note 224, at 289-91 (collecting cases and observing that
"the imputation of criminal liability on the corporation has reached its
extreme in American law").
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primarily to benefit themselves and only secondarily to
benefit the corporation.23'
The courts soon expanded these principles by holding that
corporations should be held criminally liable even for
unauthorized acts of agents and employees that were
contrary to express company policy or even contrary to
specific instructions.232 All that the courts required was some
showing that the agent or employee had been acting within
the scope of his or her authority.233 Thus by mid-century two
separate judicial trends-expansion of the collective entity
doctrine 3' and acceptance of agency theories of entity
231 See Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir.
1964). See generally Lederman, supra note 224, at 290 n.17 (collecting
cases and observing that "[clourts also have found the corporate body
liable under a respondeat superior theory even though the corporation's
agents were acquitted of the same offense").
232 The leading case is United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d
1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). See also United
States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979). Cf. United States v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 882 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1989). See
generally Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing
Corporate Criminal Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121-64 (1991);
Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanction, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1231 (1979). See
generally Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Corporate Compliance
Programs as a Defense to Criminal Liability: Can a Corporation Save its
Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REV. 605 (1995).
233 See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d at 1004;
United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572-73 (4th Cir. 1983)
(holding a corporation criminally liable for the act of an agent even though
the act was contrary to stated corporate policy). While "[tihis type of
vicarious corporate criminal liability for the acts of agents has been seen
as inconsistent with traditional criminal culpability requirements by a
number of commentators," it is now well established. Richard S. Gruner,
Towards an Organizational Jurisprudence: Transforming Corporate
Criminal Law Through Federal Sentencing Reform, 36 ARiz. L. REV. 407,
407 n.3 (1994) (collecting authorities). See also Barry W. Rashkover,
Reforming Corporations Through Prosecution: Perspectives From An SEC
Enforcement Lawyer, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 546-47 (2004) (making
reference to "a century of case law upholding corporate criminal liability").
23 See supra Part II.B (discussing development and expansion of the
collective entity doctrine).
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criminal liability-had aligned, with the result that business
entities faced much greater exposure to criminal prosecution
than had been the case when the collective entity doctrine
was first announced by the Supreme Court at the beginning
of the century.235
C. Turn of the Century Developments: Regulation of
Business Entities by Criminal Prosecution236
As the twentieth century drew to a close it became
progressively easier to use criminal prosecution as a means
of regulating the conduct of business entities. As Professor
John S. Baker, Jr. has noted, "Congress has used the
23 See generally Baker, supra note 222, at 341-43 (describing the
origins of "white collar crime," criticizing the analysis employed by
Professor Edwin Sutherland in inventing the term, and concluding that
"[miany federal offenses prosecuted under the label of 'white collar crime'
are regulatory or public welfare offenses, rather than true crimes.")
(citations omitted).
236 Commentators began to focus on the concept of regulation of
corporate entities by criminal prosecution in the late twentieth century.
See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating
Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanction, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1231
(1979); Michael B. Metzger, Corporate Criminal Liability for Defective
Products: Policies, Problems, and Prospects, 73 GEO. L.J. 1 (1984)
(discussing how criminal law is used to achieve an acceptable level of
corporate control). Professor Roberta Karmel used the term "Regulation
by Prosecution" in the title of her 1982 book, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION:
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VERSUS CORPORATE AMERICA
(1982). The author is using Professor Karmel's apt terminology to describe
the broader trend of aggressive policing of corporate conduct through
criminal prosecution that has continued, and gained considerable
momentum, after the publication of Professor Karmel's book in 1982.
Others have also explored this issue, from a variety of perspectives. See,
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on
the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 193, 238 (1991) (noting that regulators "get a bigger bang for the
buck" when they initiate criminal prosecutions); Ann Foerschler, Corporate
Criminal Intent: Toward a Better Understanding of Corporate Misconduct,
78 CAL. L. REV. 1287 (1990). For a recent, strong critique of the trend
toward regulation of business entities by criminal prosecution, see Baker,
supra note 222. For a defense of the practice, see Rashkover, supra note
233.
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Commerce Clause to vastly increase the number of federal
crimes."237 The proliferation of new federal crimes has been
accompanied by sustained efforts to apply the many new
substantive criminal law provisions to corporations and
other collective business entities. In the late twentieth
century, prosecutors also sought to develop innovative new
theories of criminal liability that would support prosecution
of business entities in situations where application of
traditional theories would not. 38  An example is the
"collective knowledge" theory by which the actions and
knowledge of a number of employees is aggregated and
imputed to the corporation to support criminal liability.9
Other examples of legal developments in the late twentieth
century that expanded business entity criminal liability
include the "public welfare doctrine" of strict criminal
237 See Baker, supra note 222, at 311 (citation omitted). Professor
Baker also notes that "merely invoking interstate commerce is not
necessarily constitutionally sufficient to justify every federal crime,"
because "[o]therwise the federal government would be exercising a general
police power, which the Constitution withholds." Id. at 312 (citations
omitted). Cf. Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The
Curious History and Distressing Implications of the Criminal Provisions of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing Guidelines Amendments That
Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 382 (2004) (noting that "[tihere are
literally hundreds of federal economic crimes").
238 See generally Baker, supra note 222; Bucy, supra note 232;
Rashkover, supra note 233.
239 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st
Cir. 1987). See also United States v. One Parcel of Land, 965 F.2d 311,
317 (7th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Bank of New England as holding that
only knowledge of corporate agents acting within the scope of their
employment will support "collective intent" conviction of the corporation).
See generally V.S. Khanna, Is the Notion of Corporate Fault a Faulty
Notion?: The Case of Corporate Mens Rea, 79 B.U. L. REV. 355 (1999). See
also Jennifer Moore, Corporate Culpability Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 743, 757-64 (1992) (discussing the concept of
corporate culpability and concluding that the Bank of New England
"collective knowledge" approach "only makes sense if employees are
viewed as aspects of a corporate entity which is distinct from each of them,
and the crime is understood not as the act of an individual, but as the act
of the corporate entity as such").
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liability for corporations that commit public welfare
offenses.. and the corporate sentencing provisions of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations,' which
took effect in 1991.242
These new theories of business entity criminal liability
laid the groundwork for a late twentieth century "golden age"
of prosecutorial activism24 3 as federal prosecutors confronted
240 See, e.g., United States v. White Fuel Corp., 498 F.2d 619, 623 n.7
(1st Cir. 1974) (explaining imposition of strict criminal liability under the
public welfare doctrine). See also Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith
Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401,
419-22 (1993) (describing the policy reasons supporting strict liability for
public welfare offenses.) Professor Baker has stated that "[miany federal
offenses prosecuted under the label of 'white-collar crime' are regulatory or
public welfare offenses, rather than true crimes." Baker, supra note 222, at
343.
241 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8. For a critique of the
organizational guidelines' "carrot and stick" approach to fostering
corporate compliance with criminal law, see Baker, supra note 222, at
316-36. For an analysis of "The Impact of the Guidelines on Corporate
Criminal Liability," see Gruner, supra note 233, at 428 ("The guidelines
will influence the activities of prosecutors, potential corporate defendants,
and individual corporate employees. They will affect the number,
character, and resolution of corporate criminal prosecutions by increasing
the attractiveness of each prosecution to authorities and the powers of
federal prosecutors in resolving corporate charges.").
242 For a summary of the history of the organizational sentencing
guidelines, see Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swensen, The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical
Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q.
205 (1993). For an analysis of some of the current issues under the
guidelines, see Julie R. O'Sullivan, Some Thoughts on Proposed Revisions
to the Organizational Guidelines, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 (2004).
Section 905 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745 (2002), directed the United States Sentencing Commission to
review and amend the federal sentencing guidelines and related policy
statements to implement the corporate compliance and accountability
provisions of that Act. For an analysis of the criminal provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the amendments to the organizational sentencing
guidelines that were required by the Act, see Bowman, supra note 237.
243 See generally Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the
Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-03: On Sideshow
Prosecutions, Spitzer's Clash With Donaldson Over Turf, the Choice of Civil
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two distinct "waves" of major corporate scandals-the Wall
Street insider trading securities fraud cases of the 1980s244
and the savings and loan scandal cases of the late 1980s and
early 1990s.245 Each of these waves of financial scandals
resulted in significant changes to the legal regime governing
the prosecution of business entity crimes.
or Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO
ST. J. CRIM. L. 443 (2004) [hereinafter Oesterle, Early Observations]. A
classic example of late twentieth century prosecutorial activism is then-
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Rudolf
Giuliani and his tactic of having Wall Street traders at Kidder Peabody
arrested and led off the trading floor in handcuffs (even though the
charges against some of those arrested were later dropped). See Michael
Powell, Giuliani, Forever With His Dukes and Dander Up, WASH. POST,
June 30, 1999, at C1 ("If he lodged some scanty charges, walked a few
stockbrokers out of their offices in handcuffs only to have judges throw out
the charges, hey ... as he explained, sometimes a prosecutor's just got to
scare people."). See also Kyle J. Kaiser, Twenty-First Century Stocks and
Pillory: Perp Walks as Pretrial Punishment, 88 IowA L. REV. 1207 n.2
(2003) (describing Giuliani incident as the "first print usage" of the term
"perp walk").
244 See generally Lance Cole, Revoking Our Privileges: Federal Law
Enforcement's Multi-Front Assault on the Attorney-Client Privilege (and
Why It Is Misguided), 48 VILL. L. REV. 469, 471 n.1 (2003) (collecting
authorities). See also Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's
Burden: Business Lawyers in Enron's Dark Shadows, 57 Bus. LAW. 1421,
1423 (2002) (describing "the economy-wide leveraged buyout (LBO) boom-
to-bust cycle attributed to junk bond financing purveyed by Michael
Milken and Drexel Burnham Lambert in the 1980s that bankrupted in the
1990s numerous companies with values in the tens of billions of dollars")
(citations omitted).
245 See generally Cole, supra note 244, at 471 n.2 (collecting
authorities). See also Cunningham, supra note 244, at 1424 (describing
"the industry-wide S&L crisis (scapegoated or epitomized by Charles
Keating and Lincoln Savings & Loan), with origins in the 1970s that
spanned the late 1980s and early 1990s, due to poor legislative controls,
weak regulatory oversight, short-sighted industry credit decisions, and
aggressive accounting practices throughout the industry.") (citations
omitted). Cf John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social
and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 278 (2004)
(observing that "Enron and the related scandals of 2001 and 2002 are
probably most comparable to the Savings and Loan (S&L) crisis of the late
1980s").
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The Wall Street insider trading scandals resulted in both
new legislation and high profile criminal prosecutions. Ivan
Boesky, Dennis Levine, and Michael Milken not only were
criminally prosecuted; they became household names and
nationally known symbols of corporate greed and excess.246
Congress responded to the revelations of a "Den of Thieves"247
on Wall Street by adopting the Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 198848 and the
Securities Law Enforcement Remedies Act of 1990.149
Coupled with the criminal provisions of the securities laws
applicable to "willful" violations,9 ' these new legislative
enactments increased both the civil and criminal sanctions
available to federal prosecutors in corporate malfeasance
cases.
The savings and loan scandals had a similar effect on the
legal regime governing corporate criminal prosecutions.
Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("FIRREA"), which included
"a dramatic increase in criminal penalties for violations of
the bank fraud statute."0 ' A new cast of characters,
246 See generally JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (1991); DAVID A.
VISE & STEVE COLL, EAGLE ON THE STREET (1991).
247 See STEWART, supra note 246 (discussing insider trading scandals
of the 1980s).
248 Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988); see generally Stuart J.
Kaswell, An Insider's View of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud
Enforcement Act of 1988, 45 BUS. LAW. 145 (1989).
249 Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990); see generally Ralph C.
Ferrara et. al., Hardball! The SECs New Arsenal of Enforcement Weapons,
47 BUS. LAW. 33 (1991); Allan A. Martin et al., SEC Enforcement Powers
and Remedies Are Greatly Expanded, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 19 (1991).
250 See generally DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND
ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS, 834-35 (West 2003) (describing the
criminal provisions of the federal securities laws, Section 24 of the
Securities Act of 1933 and Section 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934); see also Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal
Enforcement of the Federal Regulatory Statutes: The Case of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025 (2001).
5' Heidi Huntington Mayor et al., Note, Financial Institutions Fraud,
31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647 (1994).
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including Charles Keating and Lincoln Savings, Neil Bush
and Silverado Savings, and many others from that industry,
came to epitomize corporate greed and excess for the
American public.252  Perhaps more important, the huge
taxpayer losses that accompanied the savings and loan
debacle served to legitimize-and to build widespread public
support for-the use of aggressive criminal prosecutions to
punish corporate chicanery.252
As this brief summary suggests, these two late-twentieth-
century "waves" of financial scandals enhanced the ability of
federal prosecutors to use criminal prosecutions as a means
of regulating and punishing business entity malfeasance.
They combined congressional enactment of new statutes
providing for criminal prosecution with successful "test
cases" in which the new legal tools could be employed and
sharpened through the judicial process. In addition, from a
broader public policy perspective, the cumulative effect of
252 See generally MICHAEL BINSTEIN & CHARLES BOWDEN, TRUST ME:
CHARLES KEATING AND THE MISSING BILLIONS (1993); KATHLEEN DAY, S&L
HELL: THE PEOPLE AND THE POLITICS BEHIND THE $1 TRILLION SAVINGS AND
LOAN SCANDAL (1993); MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY:
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY (1990); STEPHEN PIZZO
ET AL., INSIDE JOB: THE LOOTING OF AMERICA'S SAVINGS AND LOANS (1989).
See also STEVEN WILMSEN, SILVERADO: NEIL BUSH AND THE SAVINGS AND
LOAN SCANDAL (1991).
253 Professor Baker has also recognized the importance of public
support to the development of the law in this area:
Although the Supreme Court allowed the prosecution of
corporations long ago, it is understandable that relatively
few such prosecutions occurred. Corporations were not
subject to criminal prosecution under common law. As
nonhuman persons, they were incapable of possessing mens
rea, the essential element of a guilty mind for all common
law crimes. In order to prosecute corporations as
criminals, it was necessary either to eliminate formally the
mens rea requirement, or to permit proving it fictionally by
imputing the mens rea of some individual to the
corporation. Still, as long as public support was lacking,
prosecution of what has since been labeled "white-collar
crime" was not very likely.
Baker, supra note 222, at 341 n.195 (internal citations omitted).
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those two periods of highly publicized corporate scandals was
a new acceptance of aggressive criminal prosecutions of
business entities. As a result, their impact on the world of
business entity criminal prosecutions was substantial.
As significant as the insider trading and savings and loan
scandal "waves" were, however, they were mere precursors to
the tsunami that was to follow with the failure of Enron,
WorldCom, and a number of other major corporations at the
beginning of the new century.25 '  The impact of those
business failures, on both the investing public and its
political representatives, was of a magnitude not seen since
the great stock market crash of 1929.55 Congress responded
with wide-ranging corporate reform legislation-the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002256-that increased the criminal
sanctions against corporations, 257 and federal prosecutors
25 See generally, Geoffrey P. Miller, Catastrophic Financial Failures:
Enron and More, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 423 (2004); Cunningham, supra note
244; Coffee, supra note 245. See also Abbe David Lowell and Kathryn C.
Arnold, Corporate Crime After 2000: A New Challenge or Dgjd& Vu?, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 219 (2004) (describing financial scandals and predicting that
"2002 and 2003 will likely be high-water marks for such cases"). For a
particularly strident critique of the economic, legal, and regulatory
conditions that led to the early twenty-first century financial scandals, see
William S. Lerach, Plundering America: How American Investors Got
Taken for Trillions by Corporate Insiders-The Rise of the New Corporate
Kleptocracy, 8 STANFORD J. LAW, Bus. & FIN. 69 (2002).
255 See Oesterle, supra note 244, at 445 ("We have seen business
scandals before; they seem to come in waves. The last one was the insider-
trading scandal of the 1980s involving Dennis Levine, Michael Milken,
Ivan Boesky and Martin Siegel. But the size of the 2002 debacle dwarfs
many early ones, including the Boesky ring."); Carrie Johnson & Ben
White, No Safety at the Top for Corporate Leaders, WASH. POST, July 9,
2004, at Al (quoting Professor Charles Geisst as stating that "[t]his was
the greatest period of malfeasance since the 1930s, and the only reason we
didn't have indictments in the '30s was we didn't have the laws yet.").
2,6 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 765
(2002).
257 See Rashkover, supra note 233, at 548-49 ("The Act reflects
congressional approval for criminal prosecution of corporations by
increasing, from $2.5 million to $25 million, the criminal fines available
under Exchange Act Section 32(a) applicable to any 'person other than a
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followed suit with a host of aggressive criminal prosecutions
aimed at both business entities and the executives who
managed those entities.258
D. The New Century and the New Reality:
Organizational Criminal Liability is the Rule, Not
the Exception, and the Stakes Are Life and Death
for Business Entities
By the turn of the century, large scale corporate
prosecutions had become commonplace, but with a new
twist--criminal prosecution could literally kill a business
entity criminal defendant.259 Although the Arthur Andersen
case may be the most recent, and in some ways the most
dramatic, example of this phenomenon, the trend began well
before the Andersen prosecution. Drexel Burnham Lambert
failed to survive the collateral consequences of the Michael
Milken-related criminal prosecutions in the 1980s,"' and
many believe that E.F. Hutton's 1984 multi-count guilty plea
in the check-kiting prosecution so weakened the firm that it
ultimately led to its demise as an independent brokerage
house.261
Rightly or wrongly, federal prosecutors now treat both
failed corporations and the executives who ran them into the
natural person.'") (internal citation omitted). See also Bowman, supra note
237, at 402-11 (describing "The Details of the Criminal Provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act").
25 See, e.g., Oesterle, supra note 244, at 444 n.3 (listing recent
corporate indictments, a number of which have subsequently resulted in
convictions or guilty pleas); Johnson & White, supra note 255 (providing a
"prosecutorial scorecard" of post-Enron indictments and convictions). See
also Lowell & Arnold, supra note 254.
2,9 See generally Oesterle, supra note 244, at 473-74 (discussing recent
cases).
260 See id. at 473 n.137 (describing the Drexel prosecution and
subsequent demise of the firm and collecting relevant authorities).
261 See R. William Ide III and Douglas H. Yarn, Public Independent
Fact-Finding: A Trust-Generating Institution for an Age of Corporate
Illegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1113, 1151 n.170
(2003).
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ground much like they have traditionally treated organized
crime figures, employing "perp walks"262 of indicted corporate
executives, draconian charges that are calculated to put the
entity out of business, and similar aggressive prosecutorial
tactics.26 The consequences of these aggressive prosecutorial
actions are particularly severe for business entities that rely
upon their reputation to survive: even if they ultimately
prevail on the merits at trial, it is usually too late and the
business is ruined.264
Clearly by the turn of the century the stakes could not be
any higher in cases of business entity criminal liability-a
criminal prosecution may truly constitute a "life or death"
crisis for the entity and a "life or liberty" personal crisis for
its managers.265 Moreover, as Professor Oesterle has astutely
262 See supra note 243 for discussion of then United States Attorney
Rudolf Giuliani's innovative and controversial use of "perp walks" to
disgrace suspects in the insider trading prosecutions of the 1980s.
263 See generally Baker, supra note 222, at 348 (noting that "[t]he 'war'
against corporate crime came at the same time that the chief of the Justice
Department's Criminal Division, a former organized crime prosecutor, was
also directing the Justice Department's 'war on terrorism'" and that "little
if any concern has been publicly expressed about possible abuses of the
civil liberties of corporations and their executives"). See also Bowman,
supra note 237, at 399-400 (describing July 2002 congressional testimony
of Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, head of the Justice
Department's Criminal Division, regarding the Bush Administration's
approach to corporate misbehavior).
264 See Oesterle, supra note 244, at 471-72 (discussing the "many
applications of this basic principle of the prosecutor's raw power over
defendants whose stock-in-trade is their business reputation").
265 As Professor Baker has aptly and succinctly described the current
system of corporate criminal law enforcement: "[A] federal raid can drive
down the stock price of a public company, a federal indictment can
bankrupt a company, and a federal conviction can put the CEO in jail."
Baker, supra note 222, at 355. For a late twentieth-century economic
analysis of the effect of corporate criminal prosecutions on business
entities, which concluded that "efforts to substantially increase criminal
penalties for corporate fraud, as reflected in the positions of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice, are
misguided," see Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., The Reputational
Penalty Firms Bear from Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & ECON.
757, 797 (1993). Professor Henning has identified another potential for
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observed, the recent raft of high-profile corporate
prosecutions "involve significant elevations of prosecutorial
power without a corresponding increase in systems of
prosecutorial accountability; the effectiveness of existing
systems of control will be tested."26 ' One of those existing
systems of control-the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination as presently interpreted under the
collective entity doctrine-clearly fails the test, if the test is
administered fairly and with no preconceived bias as to what
the outcome should be.267 This trend toward "significant
elevations of prosecutorial power" therefore is both the single
most important issue for our criminal justice system that has
arisen from the latest wave of corporate prosecutions and a
signal reason why the new legal environment necessitates a
reexamination of the collective entity doctrine.
E. Implications of this New Business Crime
Environment for the Collective Entity Doctrine
Now that prosecutors have readily available both the
legal tools to put business entities out of business and
widespread public support for aggressive use of those tools,
one can reasonably expect that criminal prosecutions of
business entities will continue to flourish. "  In this
environment it is no longer necessary-or acceptable-for
abuse of prosecutorial power over corporations-asset forfeiture that
results in the corporation being deprived of assistance of counsel. "The
government's power to seize assets before trial raises the troubling
possibility that it may seek to use that power to prevent a corporation from
defending itself because the business does not have the right to appointed
counsel under the Sixth Amendment." Henning, Corporate Constitutional
Rights, supra note 25, at 883. Professor Henning argues that the potential
for abuse is serious enough that "at least in that narrow circumstance, a
court should recognize the corporation's right to invoke the Sixth
Amendment and have counsel appointed for it." See id.
266 Oesterle, supra note 244, at 445.
267 See supra Part II (discussing the dubious origins and unprincipled
expansion of the collective entity doctrine).
268 Cf. Lowell & Arnold, supra note 254 (predicting that "2002 and
2003 will likely be high-water marks" of corporate criminal prosecutions).
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courts to employ the collective entity doctrine to empower
prosecutors to fight business and economic crime.269
Prosecutors no longer need the help that the collective entity
doctrine provides,27 ° if they ever truly did. It is also not
acceptable to deprive the owners of business entities,
whether a wholly owned corporation as in Braswell271 or a
huge partnership as in the Arthur Andersen prosecution,272 of
269 But see Braswell, 487 U.S. at 115 ("We note further that
recognizing a Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of the records
custodians of collective entities would have a detrimental impact on the
Government's efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most
serious problems confronting law enforcement authorities.").
270 See supra Part III.B.3 (describing the effect of recent legal
developments on the law enforcement rationale for the collective entity
doctrine). But see Oesterle, supra note 244, at 446-47 (describing the
difficulties prosecutors face in bringing complex business crime cases).
271 487 U.S. at 99.
272 Not all prosecutors agree with the decision of the Department of
Justice to put the Arthur Andersen firm out of business. New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, for instance, stated:
The consequence of indicting Arthur Andersen was we
went from five major accounting firms to four, and 60,000
people were thrown out of work. The indictment was
predicated on destruction-of-evidence charges. That
destruction of evidence was criminal. However, there was
no corporate-wide policy to destroy evidence. Therefore, I
felt that if you're going to indict the entire company and
destroy the company, do it for a policy that went to the core
of the business.
Oesterle, supra note 244, at 453 n.38. In a March 13, 2002 letter to
Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, then the head of the
Department of Justice Criminal Division, outside counsel to the Arthur
Andersen accounting firm argued against a prosecutorial charging decision
that would effectively put the firm out of business: "The Department
proposes an action that could destroy the firm, taking the livelihoods of
thousands of innocent Andersen employees and retirees; that will
substantially reduce any possibility that claimants against the firm will
obtain a recovery; and that will greatly diminish the chance for necessary
reform of the accounting profession." (Copy of letter on file with author.)
Those arguments were rejected by Mr. Chertoff and the Department of
Justice, and the Andersen firm was indicted and convicted, and soon
thereafter failed (as the government surely knew would be the case,
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a constitutional right affecting their potential loss of
livelihood (Andersen) or liberty (Braswell) based upon an
unquestioning, knee-jerk application of the collective entity
doctrine.27
As discussed above, the three great waves of financial
scandals that took place over the past twenty-odd years have
resulted in significant changes to the legal environment in
which business entity crime is now prosecuted. The world of
business crime prosecution today is radically different even
from the legal environment that existed in 1988 when the
Supreme Court decided the Braswell case and by a narrow
five-four majority reaffirmed the collective entity doctrine
(and it is so different as to be almost unrecognizable
compared to the law of business entity criminal liability that
existed when the Court first adopted the collective entity
doctrine). 4 This new business crime legal environment,
coupled with the radically different post-Fisher conception of
the Fifth Amendment and post-Kastigar conception of
immunity from prosecution that are described in Part III
above, together mandate a new look at the collective entity
doctrine."5
because a criminal conviction automatically disqualified the firm from
practicing public accounting. See Securities and Exchange Commission
Rule 102(e)(2), 17 C.F.R. 201.102(e)(2) (2002)). History may well judge the
Andersen prosecution, with its enormous collateral consequences and
impact on the lives of innocent persons, to have been the ultimate
"sideshow prosecution." See generally Oesterle, supra note 244.
273 For an example of such an approach, see the Braswell majority's
treatment of the petitioner's argument that the collective entity doctrine
should not apply to custodians of corporate records after Fisher "embarked
upon a new course of Fifth Amendment analysis." Braswell, 487 U.S. at
109. Cf. supra Part III (discussing the impact of Fisher on the collective
entity doctrine). The Braswell majority rejected this argument because
"[any claim of Fifth Amendment privilege asserted by the agent would be
tantamount to a claim of privilege by the corporation-which of course
possesses no such privilege." 487 U.S. at 110.
274 See supra Part V.A.
27" Although at first blush the suggestion that business entities should
be able to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
may appear bold or even revolutionary, particularly with respect to large
[Vol. 2005
LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
While these two radically changed legal regimes-the law
governing business crime prosecutions and Fifth Amendment
law applicable to production of documents and immunity
from prosecution-alone are sufficient to necessitate a
reexamination of the collective entity doctrine, there is
another compelling reason to do so. That reason is the
proliferation of new kinds of limited liability business
entities that has taken place in the last decade and the
manner in which the collective entity doctrine, as presently
defined, applies to those entities. Those developments are
discussed in the next Part of this Article.
V. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ENTITY FORMATION AND THEIR
RELEVANCE TO THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY
DOCTRINE
A final important reason to reexamine the collective
entity doctrine is the rise of new forms of business entities
that further complicate application of the doctrine and blur
the traditional distinctions between individual and group
business activities. The world of business entity formation
and operation has changed dramatically in the almost two
decades that have passed since the Supreme Court decided
Braswell v. United States.276 As two commentators described
corporations, other commentators have advanced even more radical
changes to the current legal regime. Professor Baker, for example, argues
that corporations should not be subject to criminal prosecution at all,
because they lack the ability to possess the requisite mens rea for criminal
culpability. See Baker, supra note 222, at 332-36. For a response to
Professor Baker, see Rashkover, supra note 233, at 535-36. Professor
Oesterle has suggested taking a "fresh look" at relying more heavily on
civil remedies rather than "sideshow" criminal prosecutions which often
fail to address the core business entity wrongdoing that first precipitated
prosecutorial attention. See Oesterle, supra note 244, at 458-59. Others
have questioned the wisdom of the current regime of corporate criminal
liability imposition. See, e.g., Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Corporate
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1477,
1477-79 (1996).
276 487 U.S. 99 (1988).
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the business entity legal landscape in 1997, "[an LLC
bandwagon has rolled across the country. 27 7  This LLC
bandwagon, growing ever more crowded and steadily gaining
momentum, has since rolled over and largely demolished
many of the traditional distinctions between incorporated
and unincorporated business entities. The demolition of
those more-than-a-century-old distinctions has important
implications for many areas of law,2 7' not the least of which is
the collective entity doctrine and its continued viability in
this new business entity environment. To examine the effect
277 William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, An Inquiry into the
Efficiency of the Limited Liability Company: Of Theory of the Firm and
Regulatory Competition, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 629, 633 (1997). Two
other influential commentators have used another colorful term to
describe the rapid growth of limited liability business entities, referring to
it as "the jungle of newly created unincorporated business forms that have
appeared in the 1990s." Robert W. Hamilton & Larry E. Ribstein, Limited
Liability and the Real World, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, (1997).
27s See generally Bratton & McCahery, supra note 277, at 634
(observing that "[tihe LLC brings us to the final stage in the evolutionary
abandonment of the historical association of, on the one hand, limited
liability, corporate governance norms, and two-tier tax treatment, and, on
the other hand, unlimited liability, partnership governance norms, and
one-tier tax treatment"). See also Committee on Bankruptcy and
Corporate Reorganization of The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, New Developments in Structured Finance, 56 Bus. LAW. 95 (2000)
(discussing issues arising out of the emergence since 1998 of a new trend
toward the use of LLCs as the "special purpose vehicles" or "SPVs" in
structured finance transactions); Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. & L. Leon Geyer,
Ten Limitations To Ponder On Farm Limited Liability Companies, 4
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 197 (1999) (discussing limited liability companies as a
choice of entity for family owned farms); Donald A. Frederick, The Impact
of LLCs on Cooperatives: Bane, Boon or Non-Event?, 13 J. COOPERATIVES
42 (1998) (arguing the limited liability company as an alternative
membership business organization has at least the potential to erode the
popularity of agricultural cooperatives); Laurence Keiser, "Hot Issues" in
Estate Planning Part II: Asset Protection Vehicles, Valuation Discounts,
Family Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 267 PRAC.
L. INST. 875 (1998) (discussing choice of entity, reporting rules, how fair
market value may be determined, and court decisions affecting family
limited partnerships).
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of the limited liability entity revolution279 on the collective
entity doctrine, it makes sense to begin the analysis with the
Supreme Court's most recent reaffirmation of the doctrine in
Braswell,280 decided in 1988-a time when only two states
had LLC statutes and the limited liability entity revolution
had only just begun.2"'
A. Deficiencies of the Collective Entity Doctrine as
Currently Defined by the Supreme Court and
Applied to New Forms of Business Entities
The core assumption of Braswell was that a business
owner's decision to operate his business "through the
corporate form"2 82 justified treating him differently than the
owner of a sole proprietorship for purposes of the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.283 This
corporate-sole proprietorship dichotomy may have made
some sense when Braswell was decided,28 ' as most businesses
were operated in one of those two forms at that time,
279 See supra note 1 (collecting authorities describing "the limited
liability revolution").
280 487 U.S. at 99.
281 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 277, at 633 ("Since 1988,
when two states provided for the new business form, forty-six additional
states have enacted enabling statutes.") (internal citation omitted). All
states now have statutes providing for the formation of LLCs. See supra
note 4.
282 487 U.S. at 104.
283 See 487 U.S. at 104 ("Had petitioner conducted his business as a
sole proprietorship, [United States v.] Doe[, 465 U.S. 605 (1984),] would
require that he be provided the opportunity to show that his act of
production would entail testimonial self-incrimination."). See also 487
U.S. at 130 ("Braswell was the sole stockholder of the corporation and ran
it himself. Perhaps that is why the Court suggests he waived his Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination rights by using the corporate form.")
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
284 Cf. 487 U.S. at 112 n.5 ("A sole proprietor does not hold records in a
representative capacity. Thus the absence of any discussion of the
collective entity rule [in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984),] can in
no way be thought a suggestion that the status of the holder of the records
is irrelevant.").
No. 1:11 LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW EVol. 2005
although even then the issue of what to do about
partnerships confused the issue.285 It makes less sense today,
however, when the availability and widespread use of the
LLC form, and particularly the single-member LLC, has
blurred the "representative capacity" distinction28 between
sole proprietorships and the corporate form.
The Braswell Court made quite clear that its decision
turned on the fact that "petitioner has operated his business
through the corporate form, and we have long recognized
that, for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, corporations and
other collective entities are treated differently from
individuals.""7  The reasons supporting this differential
treatment are less clear, however, particularly if one parses
carefully the portions of the Braswell opinion that discuss
the collective entity doctrine. The Braswell Court
acknowledged that the original rationale for the collective
entity doctrine, the visitatorial powers rationale,288 had long
since been "jettisoned" by the Court and therefore no longer
served to support the collective entity doctrine.289 The Court
also acknowledged that the other historical rationale for the
collective entity doctrine, the "group interests" rationale,29
no longer provided adequate support for the doctrine,
particularly when "reduced to a simple proposition based
285 See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974) (acknowledging
the difficulties of applying the collective entity doctrine to a small
partnership). See also In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated
November 13, 1984 (Doe), 605 F. Supp. 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (refusing to
apply the collective entity doctrine to a husband and wife partnership with
no employees); Slone-Stiver v. Broock (In re Tower Metal Alloy Co.), 200
B.R. 598 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996) (allowing husband and wife to invoke
their Fifth Amendment privilege for papers created under an entity name
where the nature of the entity was in question but determined by the court
not to be a collective entity).
286 See 417 U.S. at 97-101.
287 487 U.S. at 104.
218 See supra Parts II.A and B (discussing the visitatorial powers
rationale for the collective entity doctrine).
289 487 U.S. at 108.
29o See supra notes 101-15 (discussing the "group interests" rationale
articulated by the Court in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944)).
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solely upon the size of the organization."291 In essence, the
Court acknowledged that neither of the two primary
rationales for the collective entity doctrine throughout the
many decades of its development retains any vitality today.
What, then, did the Court identify as the supporting
rationale for the doctrine in the modern era?
The Braswell decision purports to review the development
of the collective entity doctrine up to that point in time and
identify a new rationale for the doctrine-an "agency
rationale" based upon the "representative capacity" in which
the holder of entity documents and records produces those
records in response to governmental process.292 Under this
"agency rationale"293 rubric a "custodian's act of production is
not deemed a personal act"294 because the custodian of
business entity records, unlike a sole proprietor, "holds ...
documents in a representative rather than a personal
capacity."291 This new rationale is unsatisfying, however,
because when carefully examined it fails to answer the
critical question of why a collective entity should not be
permitted to assert a fundamental296 constitutional right-
the privilege against self-incrimination-when the previous
rationales for depriving collective entities of that right have
been found inadequate to support the doctrine's current
application. Instead, Braswell says only that the custodian
of the collective entity's documents and records should be
291 487 U.S. at 108 (citing Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 100
(1974)).
292 See id. at 109-10 (rejecting the argument that the holdings of
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), and United States v. Doe, 465
U.S. 605 (1984), "rendered the collective entity doctrine obsolete"). See
also supra notes 180-86 (discussing the author's view of how Fisher in fact
did affect the continued viability of the collective entity doctrine).
293 See 487 U.S. at 109.
294 Id. at 110.
295 Id.
296 The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a
"fundamental" constitutional right both in the sense that it is a right that
is textually recognized in the Constitution and has been "incorporated"
and held applicable to the states; see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
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denied that right because "[any claim of Fifth Amendment
privilege asserted by the agent would be tantamount to a
claim of privilege by the corporation-which of course
possesses no such privilege."297
The Court's reasoning on this crucial issue is both circular
and tautological; it fails to provide a satisfactory rationale for
withholding the privilege from corporations and other
collective entities.298 As in the Court's earlier collective entity
cases, discussed in Part II supra, the Braswell Court's real
reason for clinging to the collective entity doctrine appears to
have been the concern that abandoning the doctrine "would
have a detrimental impact on the Government's efforts to
prosecute 'white-collar crime,' one of the most serious
297 See 487 U.S. at 110. See also id. at 111 n.5 ("A sole proprietor does
not hold records in a representative capacity. Thus, the absence [in Doe] of
any discussion of the collective entity rule can in no way be thought a
suggestion that the status of the holder of the records is irrelevant.").
298 Justice Kennedy's Braswell dissent does not question the continued
vitality of the collective entity doctrine, but rather takes issue with the
majority's application of the doctrine to deprive the owner of a wholly
owned corporation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Justice Kennedy does, however, go farther than the
Braswell majority in articulating a rationale for the continued vitality of
the doctrine, stating that the doctrine "illuminated" a critical foundation of
the Fifth Amendment-"that it is an explicit right of a natural person,
protecting the realm of human thought and expression." See 487 U.S. at
119. Commentators since the Braswell decision have expanded upon this
conceptual approach to the protection provided by the Self-Incrimination
Clause. See Nagareda, supra note 29; Amar & Lettow, supra note 34;
Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 171; Henning, Testing the Limits,
supra note 35. While this conceptual approach explains the importance of
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to natural
persons, it does not explain why business entities that can also be subject
to criminal prosecution, see Part IV supra, and who otherwise enjoy the
privileges and immunities of a legal "person" under the Constitution
should be denied this particular constitutional right. Cf. Michael D.
Rivard, Comment, Toward a General Theory of Constitutional Personhood:
A Theory of Constitutional Personhood for Transgenic Humanoid Species,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1452 n.103 (1992) (listing the evolution of Supreme
Court decisions that expanded the definition of "person" to include
corporations under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
and the Due Process Clause for property rights).
[Vol. 2005
LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
problems confronting law enforcement authorities."299 No
matter how serious the problem of white collar crime may be,
however, the assertion that abandoning the collective entity
doctrine would have a significant detrimental impact on
governmental efforts to combat the problem no longer is well-
founded, as demonstrated by the analysis in Part III.B of this
Article. 00
These deficiencies in the collective entity doctrine as
redefined by the Braswell Court have taken on new
importance as a result of the "explosion" since the 1990s 30 1 in
the formation of new limited liability entities that are
potentially subject to the doctrine. As one commentator has
described the situation, "[t]he rate of growth of LLCs is
299 See 487 U.S. at 115.
300 See supra notes 268-75.
301 See David L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited
Liability Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules
for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation
for the Limited Liability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 427, 429 (1998) ("The
past seven years have seen an explosion in the kinds of new entities with
limited liability."); Thomas E. Rutledge, supra note 3, at 1414 (making
reference to "the Limited Liability Company (LLC) explosion in the
1990s"); Dale A. Oesterle, Subcurrents in LLC Statutes: Limiting the
Discretion of State Courts to Restructure the Internal Affairs of Small
Business, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 881, 881 (1995) ("The ongoing revolution in
small business structure is driven by the belief that limited liability should
be available to businesses without a tax penalty."). As a leading
commentator has explained, it was the Internal Revenue Service
classification of a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for tax purposes that
ignited the LLC explosion of the 1990s. See Larry E Ribstein, The
Emergence of the Limited Liability Company, 51 Bus. LAw. 1 (1995)
[hereinafter Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC] ("The first LLC statute was
adopted in Wyoming in 1977. The LLC was not truly born, however, until
1988 when it was 'spanked' by Revenue Ruling 88-76. With this now
famous ruling, the IRS classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership for tax
purposes. The importance of Revenue Ruling 88-76 to the development of
LLCs is illustrated by a few statistics. By 1988 [the year the Supreme
Court decided Braswell], eleven years after the enactment of the Wyoming
Statute, only one other state (Florida) had enacted an LLC statute and
there were only twenty-six LLCs in Wyoming. By the end of 1994, forty-
six additional statutes had been passed and tens of thousands of LLCs had
been formed.") (citations omitted).
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phenomenal""°2 and "[t]he percentage increase in nationwide
LLC filings is incredible. 3 °3  Some of this rapid growth is
attributable to the proliferation of single-member LLCs, as
small business owners who otherwise would have operated
their business as a sole proprietorship have recognized that
forming an LLC is a simpler and less costly alternative to
incorporation that provides the same limited liability
protection without adverse tax consequences.0  Those
business owners (with the assistance of their counsel in most
instances, one hopes) are forming LLCs in order to obtain
these benefits. They may be doing so without realizing-and
without their counsel realizing-that under present law one
unintended adverse consequence may be the loss of their
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination for
production of their business records and documents.3 5
B. Special Problems Arising Out of Application of the
Collective Entity Doctrine as Currently Defined by
the Supreme Court to Single-Member Limited
Liability Companies
While the narrow holding of Braswell applies only to
corporations with a sole shareholder, and perhaps not even
302 Cohen, supra note 301, at 448.
303 Id. at 448 n.113.
304 See GUIDE TO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 2 (CCH 2001) (noting
that "currently only Massachusetts still requires that an LLC have two or
more members"). See generally Ribstein, Emergence of the LLC, supra
note 301, at 7 n.41 (noting that in 1995 approximately one-third of states
permitted formation of single-member LLC's); Larry E. Ribstein, The New
Choice of Entity for Entrepreneurs, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. 325, 340 (1997)
(describing the special legal issues presented by the formation of a single-
member LLC); Debra Cohen-Whelan, Individual Responsibility in the
Wake of Limited Liability, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 335, 340-45 (1998) (describing
the incentives for forming an LLC).
305 Cf. Mitchell F. Crusto, Extending the Veil to Solo Entrepreneurs: A
Limited Liability Sole Proprietorship Act (LLSP), 2001 COLUM. Bus. L.
REV. 381, 389 (2001) (noting that a sole proprietorship is entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection regarding its business records, although the
contents of those records are not protected).
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to all such corporations," 6 the reasoning of Braswell is also
potentially applicable to single-member LLCs, and some
courts have already applied it to such LLCs °7 Whether or
not Braswell's reasoning should be applied to a single-
member LLC is by no means an open-and-shut case,
however. Even if one accepts the Braswell Court's
distinction between a sole proprietorship and a wholly owned
corporation,"8 the same distinction may not be present if the
comparison is between a sole proprietorship and a single-
member LLC.
In particular, the "agency rationale" and "representative
capacity" reasoning relied upon in Braswell as reasons to
retain the collective entity doctrine and apply it to a wholly
owned corporation do not apply with the same force to a
single-member LLC (or for that matter, to member-managed
LLCs, which are discussed in the next section of this Article).
The legal structure and operating arrangements of a single-
member LLC differ in important ways from those of a
traditional business corporation like the one before the Court
in Braswell.9 Perhaps most important, the owners of an
LLC are permitted by law to organize and operate the
business entity in a very informal manner, without
adherence to "corporate formalities" and in most jurisdictions
without keeping any particular records.310 Even closely held
306 See Braswell, 487 U.S. 99, 118-19 n.11 ("We leave open the
question whether the agency rationale supports compelling a custodian to
produce corporate records when the custodian is able to establish, by
showing for example that he is the sole employee and officer of the
corporation, that the jury would inevitably conclude that he produced the
records.").
307 See SEC v. Dunlap, 253 F.3d 768 (4th Cir. 2001).
308 See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 111 n.5 (discussing the sole
proprietorship-corporation distinction).
309 See id. at 101 (discussing the legal structure and operating
arrangements of the wholly owned corporations that Randy Braswell had
formed).
310 See Cohen, supra note 301, at 456-57 (discussing the differences
between corporations and LLCs with respect to judicial "veil piercing").
See also Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and
Network Externalities, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 79, 89-91 (2001) (discussing
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corporations, in contrast, are required to comply with a
variety of state-law incorporation, corporate governance, and
record-keeping requirements."' Unlike corporations, which
under state law must have officers, LLCs are not required to
have officers" and under the laws of most states the
management rights of an LLC are vested in the members
unless the LLC's operating agreement provides otherwise."'
the differences between LLCs and corporations); Richardson & Geyer,
supra note 275 (discussing the differences between LLCs and corporations
in the agricultural law context); Cohen-Whelan, supra note 304, at 341-44
(discussing the flexibility of LLC operating agreements and less
governmental regulation in comparison to corporations).
311 See generally Managing Closely Held Corporations: A Legal
Guidebook (Report by the Committee on Corporate Laws, ABA Section of
Business Law), 58 Bus. LAw. 1077 (2003); Sela E. Stroud, Director and
Officer Liability to Non-Shareholders, 64 ALA. LAW. 316, 316-17 (2003)
(stating that even without piercing the corporate veil, directors and
officers of a closely held corporation may still be held individually liable if
they participate in unscrupulous behavior); G. Michael Epperson & Joan
M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder's Ultimate Calamity: Pierced
Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia,
Maryland, and Virginia, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 612-14 & 630-31 (1988)
(discussing piercing the corporate veil generally and treatment in Virginia
specifically); Cohen, supra note 301, at 455-58 (discussing piercing the
LLC veil).
312 The Braswell Court noted that in compliance with Mississippi law,
the corporations in that case had both directors and officers other than
Randy Braswell, although the other officers and directors were Braswell's
wife and mother, and neither had "any authority over the business affairs
of either corporation." See 487 U.S. at 101.
33 See GUIDE TO LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, supra note 304, noting
that this default provision is present in almost all state statutes and that
"LLCs do not generally have the same requirement" for officers that
corporations have by state statutes). See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL.,
1 CORPORATIONS §§ 1.11-1.12 (Aspen 2002) (discussing LLC management);
J. William Callison, Venture Capital and Corporate Governance: Evolving
the Limited Liability Company to Finance the Entrepreneurial Business, 26
IOWA J. CORP. L. 97, 106-08 (2000) (discussing forms of LLC management);
Carol J. Miller et al., Limited Liability Companies Before And After The
January 1997 IRS "Check-The-Box" Regulations: Choice Of Entity And
Taxation Considerations, 25 N. KY. L. REV. 585, 588-93 (1998) (discussing
the management structure of LLCs).
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These differences between a corporation and a single-
member LLC are important because they go to the heart of
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Braswell-owners of
single-member LLCs (or, for that matter, most member-
managed LLCs) do not necessarily view themselves as, or
conduct their business as if they were, agents of a separate
corporate entity. Unlike an individual who forms a
corporation and must recruit directors, appoint officers, keep
minutes of board meetings, and file tax returns for the
corporate entity,31 ' the owner of a single-member LLC may
well view the entity as an extension of himself-in other
words, much more like a sole proprietorship than a
corporation. These comparisons all point to the conclusion
that in many ways a single-member LLC, as a practical
matter, is more like a sole proprietorship than it is like a
corporation.31 For this reason, at least in the case of a
single-member LLC, it is far from clear that the "agency
rationale" relied upon in Braswell justifies depriving the LLC
owner of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege.316  A
314 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 101 ("Both companies are active corporations,
maintaining their current status with the State of Mississippi, filing
corporate tax returns, and keeping current corporate books and records.
In compliance with Mississippi law, both corporations have three directors,
petitioner, his wife, and his mother.").
315 As one commentator has observed, "[i]f there is only one LLC
member, the company is effectively a sole proprietorship." Cohen-Whelan,
supra note 304, at 349. Moreover, IRS "check-the-box" regulations treat a
single-member LLC as a sole proprietorship. See Jeffrey A. Maine,
Linking Limited Liability and Entity Taxation: A Critique of the ALI
Reporters' Study on the Taxation of Private Business Enterprises, 62 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 223, 239 n.81 (2000) (noting that in response to the I.R.S.
regulations a number of states amended their LLC statutes to allow
single-member LLCs).
316 The Braswell Court acknowledged some limitation to the "agency
rationale," albeit one based upon the act of production doctrine, in a
footnote at the end of the majority opinion: "We leave open the question
whether the agency rationale supports compelling a custodian to produce
corporate records when the custodian is able to establish, by showing for
example that he is the sole employee and officer of the corporation, that
the jury would inevitably conclude that he produced the records." 487
U.S. at 118-19 n.11.
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mechanical application of the collective entity doctrine of the
type employed by the majority in Braswell would lead to that
result, however, because an LLC is no less a separate
"collective entity" than the wholly owned corporation in
Braswell, and therefore, under the reasoning of that decision,
should also be "treated differently from individuals" " for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
C. Special Problems Arising Out of Application of the
Collective Entity Doctrine as Currently Defined by
the Supreme Court to Member-Managed Limited
Liability Companies (and to General Partnerships)
Under present law one of the most significant legal
distinctions among the many forms of LLCs is the distinction
between "member-managed" LLCs and "manager-managed"
LLCs.318 This distinction is also relevant to an analysis of the
application of the collective entity doctrine to limited liability
companies, particularly under the "agency rationale"
employed by the Supreme Court in its Bellis and Braswell
decisions. 9 Non-manager members of LLCs who knowingly
and intentionally contract away their rights to participate in
the management and operation of the LLC are consenting to
an agency relationship in which the manager-members
represent their interests, much like the shareholders in a
widely held corporation. Treating those LLC members
differently from the members of a member-managed LLC,
317 Braswell, 487 U.S. at 104.
318 See HUMPHREYS, supra note 10, at § 4.02 (stating the flexible
management of the LLC is a significant advantage); Ribstein, supra note
10, at 323-24 (stating that a major difference between LLCs and LLPs is
the flexibility in LLC management structure); Scott R. Anderson, The
Illinois Limited Liability Company: A Flexible Alternative for Business, 25
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 55, 91-93 (1993) (discussing the importance of the
different management structures of LLCs).
319 See supra notes 140-45 (discussing Bellis's "held by a member of
the firm in a representative capacity" analysis) and notes 294-302
(discussing Braswell's "agency rationale" and "representative capacity"
analysis).
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who participate directly in the affairs of the entity and have
not contracted away their rights to do so, with respect to
assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege may make sense. 2 '
1. Relevant Characteristics of Member-Managed
LLCs
Based upon this distinction, there is good reason to
conclude that the members of a manager-managed LLC
should not be permitted to assert a Fifth Amendment
privilege with respect to LLC documents, but to reach that
conclusion it is not necessary to rely upon the collective
entity doctrine "agency rationale" reasoning the Supreme
Court employed in Bellis and Braswell. Instead, that
conclusion is amply supported by another more fundamental,
and much more doctrinally solid, long-standing principle of
Fifth Amendment law-the principle that the privilege
against self-incrimination is a personal privilege that cannot
be asserted by a third party, whether the third party is
another individual or a business entity and whether or not
the witness is an agent of the third party. 2 ' While that
320 Cf. Cohen, supra note 301, at 458 (recognizing that a distinction
based upon whether an LLC is manager controlled or member controlled
"might make sense" under "dominance doctrine" of veil piercing).
321 See supra note 41 (discussing the holding of Hale v. Henkel). This
principle has two corollaries. One is the rule that a witness cannot assert
the Fifth Amendment as to the witness's own testimony to protect a third
party. See, e.g., Braswell, 487 U.S. at 120 ("All accept the longstanding
rule that labor unions, corporations, partnerships, and other collective
entities have no Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege [and] that a
natural person cannot assert such a privilege on their behalf.") (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (emphasis added); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S.
564 (1976) (noting that the Fifth Amendment gave a grand jury witness
the right not to answer questions which would be incriminating, but that
the witness could not commit perjury and then use the Fifth Amendment
to suppress his grand jury statements as incriminating); Rogers v. United
States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (holding that the privilege against self-
incrimination cannot be asserted by a Communist Party treasurer as
grounds for refusing to answer grand jury questions regarding to whom
she turned over the party's financial books, thereby seeking to protect the
holder of the books); In re Investigative Grand Jury Proceedings, 432 F.
No. 1:1] LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW RE WE W [Vol. 2005
principle does not address the question of whether or not the
business entity itself should be permitted to assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination with respect
to production of entity documents and records, an issue that
is addressed below, it does strongly support the conclusion
that non-manager members of a manager-managed LLC
should not be permitted to assert a Fifth Amendment
privilege for LLC documents and records (just as the
shareholders of a widely held corporation should not be
permitted to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege for
corporate books and records).
Basing Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination analysis on this distinction-the distinction
Supp. 50 (W.D. Va. 1977) (multiple representation of clients was improper
partly because clients could improperly assert the Fifth Amendment to
protect others involved in the investigation). The other corollary is the
rule that a defendant or target of a prosecution cannot assert the Fifth
Amendment as to a third party witness's testimony, no matter how
incriminating that testimony may be for the defendant/target. See, e.g.,
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (affirming appellate court's
finding that defendant could not assert Fifth Amendment to halt
compelled production of incriminating documents from her attorney);
United States v. Richardson, 1 F. Supp. 2d 495 (D.V.I. 1998) (holding
defendant had no standing to complain of violation of co-defendant's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination when co-defendant's
statement incriminated the defendant); United States v. Onassis, 133 F.
Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (holding that indicted partner could not assert
Fifth Amendment protections to quash a subpoena to a third party partner
that sought incriminating documents against the indicted partner). Both
of these corollaries apply to the manager-managed LLC situation
discussed above-a non-manager member should not be permitted to
assert a Fifth Amendment privilege as to her own testimony in order to
avoid incriminating the LLC, and a non-manager member should not be
permitted to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege on behalf of the LLC with
respect to LLC documents or records that would incriminate her. The
rationale supporting these conclusions is not the collective entity doctrine
per se, however; it is instead a recognition that in this situation the entity
and the non-manager member are distinct legal persons. This rationale
also says nothing, one way or the other, about whether the LLC entity
itself should be permitted to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege as a
distinct legal person with respect to production of entity documents and
records.
[Vol. 2005COLUMBIA BUSINESS LA W REVIEW
LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
between member-managed limited liability entities and
manager-managed limited liability entities-makes at least
as much sense as Braswell's distinction between wholly
owned corporations and sole proprietorships. It also would
recognize, and respect, the practical reality that the
members of a member-managed LLC (much like the owner of
a single-member LLC and unlike corporate shareholders), do
not regard the LLC as a separate legal entity with an
identity distinct from that of its members. In this regard, a
member-managed LLC is much more like a general
partnership than it is like a corporation (or for that matter a
manager-managed LLC).
2. How Should Member-Managed LLCs and
General Partnerships Be Treated Under the
Fifth Amendment?-The Most Difficult Cases
This analogy to general partnerships leads ineluctably to
the most difficult issue presented under the current
application of the collective entity doctrine by the Supreme
Court and, not coincidentally, the issue that presents the
greatest analytical challenge when positing a regime in
which business entities are permitted to assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege, as this Article advocates: How should
general partnerships be treated under the Fifth
Amendment? The Supreme Court last addressed this issue
in Bellis v. United States32 and, as discussed above,323 failed
to provide a satisfying rationale for depriving the members of
a small general partnership of their ability to assert a Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination with respect
to partnership documents and records. The reasons
advanced by the Bellis majority for doing so in 1974 hinged
upon acceptance of two conceptual propositions.
The first, and most hotly debated in partnership law
generally, is the proposition that in general a partnership is
"an organization which is recognized as an independent
322 417 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1974).
323 See supra at notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
No. 1:1]
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
entity apart from its individual members."324 The second,
and no less debatable, proposition advanced by the Bellis
majority was that even the small, three-person partnership
before the Court in that case had "an established
institutional identity independent of its individual
partners."3 5 Acceptance of these propositions led the Court
to conclude that an individual partner in even a very small
partnership holds partnership records in "a representative
capacity" and therefore should not be permitted to assert a
personal privilege against self-incrimination as to those
records. Neither of these conceptual points is nearly as
clear-cut as the Bellis majority opinion suggests, however.
The problem with relying upon the "independent entity"
conceptual proposition as the basis for deciding a case
involving a core constitutional right is that in essence it
represents yet another front, although admittedly a
somewhat obscure one, in the ongoing conflict between the
"aggregate theory" and the "entity theory" of partnership law
that has raged for a century without any satisfactory
resolution. 26 The difficulty of this core conceptual issue of
partnership law-and its lack of susceptibility to a definitive
"right" answer-is demonstrated by the fact that it remains
unresolved to this day, as some states continue to adhere to
the "aggregate theory" of the original 1914 Uniform
Partnership Act ("UPA") while other states have adopted the
new 1997 Revised Uniform Partnership Act ("RUPA") with
324 417 U.S. at 92.
325 Id. at 95.
326 See generally WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP, at § 182 (3d ed. 2001). See also Deborah A. DeMott,
Symposium: Unincorporated Business Entities: Transatlantic Perspectives
on Partnership Law: Risk and Instability, 26 IOWA J. CORP. L. 879, 882-83
(2001) (discussing difference between aggregate and entity theories); Larry
E. Ribstein, Preparing The Corporate Lawyer: Corporations or Business
Associations? The Wisdom and Folly of an Integrated Course, 34 GA. L.
REV. 973, 983-84 (2000); J. Dennis Hynes, The Revised Uniform
Partnership Act: Some Comments on the Latest Draft of RUPA, 19 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 727, 731 nn.23 & 24 (1992).
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its shift to an "entity theory" of partnership law.3 27  The
closeness of the issue is further illustrated by the fact that
the states are almost evenly split between adoption of the
UPA and RUPA 28 For these reasons, the Court's first
conceptual proposition of general partnership law is not a
sound basis for deciding such an important constitutional
issue. This flaw in the Court's reasoning is compounded
when applied to the particular kind of partnership that was
before the Court in Bellis.
What appears to have been the most troubling issue for
the Bellis majority was whether the small, three-person
Pennsylvania law partnership before the Court should be
treated differently for Fifth Amendment purposes than a
much larger, more institutional partnership entity. The
majority had little difficulty concluding that it should deny a
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to the
kind of large, institutional partnerships that include "[s]ome
of the most powerful private institutions in the Nation ...
[such as] Wall Street law firms and stock brokerage firms...
[that are] large, impersonal, highly structured enterprises of
essentially perpetual duration."329 The Court agreed with
lower courts that applying the then-governing White test33 °
for application of the collective entity doctrine covered such
organizations. Even stretched to its limits, however, the
327 See generally GREGORY, supra note 326, at §§ 174 & 182 (describing
differences between UPA and RUPA and collecting early authorities on the
"aggregate vs. entity" debate in partnership law). See also Ann C.
McGinley, Functionality or Formalism? Partners and Shareholders as
"Employees" Under the Anti-Discrimination Laws, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 3, 43
n.237 (2004) (stating that as of 2002 thirty-one states had adopted RUPA
with its 1997 Amendments); Peter B. Oh, A Jurisdictional Approach To
Collapsing Corporate Distinctions, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 389, 389 n.1 (2003)
(discussing UPA and RUPA and listing citations).
328 See REV. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT APP. B (2003 ed.) (listing state
adoptions of RUPA). For the most current breakdown of UPA and RUPA
among the states see http://www.nccusl.org/update/uniformact-
factsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa9497.asp (last visited Jan. 22, 2005).
329 See Bellis, 417 U.S. 85, at 93-94 (1974).
330 The White test for application of the collective entity doctrine is
discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 109-14.
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White test would have difficulty encompassing the small
partnership in Bellis" The Court, appearing reluctant,33
went on to hold that the small Bellis partnership was
encompassed by the White test, based on the conclusion,
discussed above, that even the very small Bellis partnership
had "held itself out to third parties as an entity with an
independent institutional identity."333 The Court's discomfort
in doing so, evident in the language of its opinion," ' as well
as its obvious motivation to avoid interfering with law
enforcement efforts directed at business entities,3 are ironic
when one considers that within little more than a year's time
the Court would decide the Fisher case and redefine the Fifth
Amendment in a manner that would make the holding in
331 See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 100 ("On its face, the [White] test is not
particularly helpful in the broad range of cases, including this one, where
the organization embodies neither 'purely . .. personal interests' nor
'group interests only,' but rather some combination of the two.").
332 For evidence of the Court's reluctance, see the portions of the Bellis
opinion that acknowledge "the force of [the] arguments" against
application of the doctrine to such a small partnership, id. at 95, and
concede that a different conclusion might be appropriate if the case
"involved a small family partnership .. . or ... if there were some other
pre-existing relationship of confidentiality among the partners," id. at 101
(internal citations omitted).
33 Id. at 97. The weakness of the majority's conclusion on this point is
succinctly exposed by Justice Douglas's retort in his dissenting opinion:
"This partnership is as different from a labor union or the run of
corporations as black is from white." Id. at 103 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
334 See supra note 143 (quoting language evidencing the Court's
reluctance to expand the collective entity doctrine to cover very small
general partnerships that lack a clearly defined institutional identity
separate from the individual general partners).
335 See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 94 ("It is inconceivable that a brokerage
house with offices from coast to coast handling millions of dollars of
investment transactions annually should be entitled to immunize its
records from SEC scrutiny solely because it operates as a partnership
rather than in the corporate form."). See also supra notes 106-09 and
accompanying text (discussing the law enforcement rationale underlying
the White case).
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Bellis (and the subsequent, even more misguided, holding in
336Braswell) unnecessary.
3. A Fully Informed Analysis of the Application of
the Collective Entity Doctrine to
Unincorporated Business Entities After Fisher
and Kastigar
Under current law, post-Kastigar and post-Fisher, it is
not necessary to take the position as a matter of Fifth
Amendment constitutional law that a general partnership-
or even a member-managed limited liability company-has a
legal identity separate from its individual members. After
Fisher, a privilege against self-incrimination cannot be
asserted as to the contents of partnership records, so the only
issue in such cases is whether the privilege can be asserted
for the act of producing those records.337 Moreover, in all
cases in which the government has prior knowledge of the
existence, location, and authenticity of the records, no act of
production privilege can be asserted because there is no
testimonial aspect to the act of production. As a consequence
of this now-settled law, in most criminal investigations
involving business entities, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination simply has no application and
cannot be asserted-either on behalf of the business entity or
its individual members.338 The same is true, of course, for
records of wholly owned corporations, single-member limited
liability companies, and sole proprietorships-whenever the
government has prior knowledge of the documents or records
336 See supra Part III.B.3 (describing the author's view of the combined
effect of the Fisher and Kastigar holdings on the application of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to collective entities).
... Or, in the unusual case in which tangible evidence other than
documents and business records is sought, some other tangible thing.
338 See generally Lance Cole, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled
Production of Personal Documents After United States v. Hubbell-New
Protection for Private Papers?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 123, 184-87 (2002);
Robert P. Mosteller, Cowboy Prosecutors and Subpoenas for Incriminating
Evidence: The Consequences and Correction of Excess, 58 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 487, 543-46 (2001).
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it is seeking, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination cannot be asserted as to those documents or
records.
For analytical purposes, this leaves a relatively narrow
category of cases in which the government lacks information
concerning the existence, location, or authenticity of business
records but seeks to subpoena such records if they exist.
These might be called "fishing expedition" cases... in which a
prosecutorial fishing expedition is appropriate even though
the prosecutor's fishing line (a grand jury subpoena) is being
cast into more or less uncharted waters. But would
permitting a general partnership or a member-managed
limited liability company--or any other business entity, for
that matter-to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination really make a difference and "largely
frustrate legitimate governmental regulation of such
organizations"34 in even this narrow class of cases? The
answer is that it would not, for reasons that are discussed
below. Moreover, the Supreme Court's concerns in Bellis and
Braswell about interfering with law enforcement can be
dismissed if one takes into account the peculiar facts of those
cases that make them both unrepresentative of typical
criminal investigations. Those facts are also discussed
below.
The reason that permitting a general partnership or other
business entity to assert a Fifth Amendment privilege would
not have a significant adverse effect on law enforcement
interests is that in almost all such cases the government
would be able to overcome an assertion of privilege by the
entity through one of two ways provided for under post-
Kastigar and post-Fisher constitutional law. The first, and
simplest, way to do so would be simply to grant act of
339 See United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 42 (2000) ("What the
District Court characterized as a 'fishing expedition' did produce a fish,
but not the one the Independent Counsel expected to hook."). See also
H. Richard Uviller, Forward: Fisher Goes on the Quintessential Fishing
Expedition and Hubbell is Off the Hook, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 311
(2001).
340 Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90.
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production immunity to the entity and compel production of
the subpoenaed documents. In cases where the objective of
the government is to prosecute responsible individual
members of the entity, and not the entity itself (as appears to
have been the case in both the Bellis and Braswell cases,
where the target of the investigation was an individual and
not the entities involved) the government gives up nothing
by granting act of production immunity to the entity.
Even in cases where the government lacks information
about the existence, location, or authenticity of documents
and wishes to prosecute, or at least retain the ability to
prosecute, the entity itself, a grant of use and derivative use
immunity for the act of producing documents will not
necessarily always preclude subsequent prosecution of the
entity. In fact, prior to the Supreme Court's Hubbell
decision, a good argument could be made that such a grant of
immunity should never preclude subsequent prosecution of
the party producing the documents because of the paucity of
testimonial information communicated by the act of
production. The Hubbell decision's broad conception of what
constitutes a derivative use of the communicative aspects of
the act of production of documents has complicated the
analysis, and in some cases a prudent prosecutor now may
have legitimate concerns that granting act of production
immunity to a business entity could foreclose a subsequent
prosecution of the entity."1 Even where those concerns are
present, however, there is a second way to overcome an
entity's assertion of the privilege, and it is a way that should
be available in every case in which the privilege can be
overcome without unduly abrogating individual rights (as
arguably occurred in the Braswell case).
This second way to overcome an entity assertion of the
privilege is for the government to obtain enough information
about tbe documents or records being sought to establish
341 Professor Mosteller has described this repercussion of the Hubbell
holding as "The Practical Death of Use Immunity for Unknown
Documents." See Mosteller, supra note 337, at 517.
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their existence, location, and authenticity. As noted above,342
Fisher and Hubbell make clear that once the government has
obtained such information an act of production privilege
cannot be asserted. The government will have the means to
obtain that information in any case involving a collective
entity simply by obtaining testimony, whether or not
pursuant to a grant of immunity, from an employee or
member of the organization whom the government does not
view as a potential subject or target of prosecution. This will
be easily accomplished in all cases except those few in which
the organization is so small that everyone associated with it
who has knowledge sufficient to confirm the existence,
location, and authenticity of subpoenaed records-whether
an employee or a member-is involved in the suspected
criminal misconduct and is a subject or target of the criminal
investigation (and therefore have reason to assert the
privilege against self-incrimination). Those situations
should be exceedingly rare, however, and in almost all cases
involving even small business entities the government
should be able to identify a good candidate for immunity (or
a plea bargain) who can provide the requisite information
about entity documents or records so as to overcome any
assertion of an act of production privilege with respect to
those documents and records. Moreover, in some such cases
the government may be able to obtain testimony about the
existence, location, and authenticity of entity documents
from some third party who is not a subject or target of the
investigation, as was the case in Fisher with the accountants
who had knowledge of the tax working papers that the
government was seeking." '
So what of the remaining very small class of cases in
which the government wishes to prosecute a business entity
and all of its members and employees, but does not have
enough information about the documents and records of the
342 See supra notes 181-84 (discussing Fisher) and notes 213-17
(discussing Hubbell).
343 See generally Mosteller, supra note 176, at 519-20 (analyzing the
extent of the government's knowledge of the documents at issue in Fisher).
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business to overcome an assertion of act of production
privilege and is unwilling to grant immunity to any employee
or member of the entity so as to obtain that information?
Ironically, Braswell appears to have been just such a case.
Randy Braswell was the sole shareholder of the corporations
involved and appears to have been the only person with
knowledge about the existence, location, and authenticity of
the subpoenaed records. " He also appears to have been the
target of the criminal investigation.345 If such a case arose
today a prosecutor presumably would not be willing to grant
him act of production immunity because after Hubbell doing
so might well preclude any subsequent prosecution."6
This conclusion does not, however, suggest that courts
should continue to cling to the collective entity doctrine. To
the contrary, the reason the prosecution would not be able to
overcome assertions of the privilege against self-
incrimination by Randy Braswell and his companies is that
in such a case his custody of the corporate records really
cannot "be fairly said to be [in] a representative capacity"
347
and his act of production of those records really is not "one in
his representative rather than [his] personal capacity."" '4 To
U" See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 101 (1988).
35 See id. at 127 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
346 See generally Mosteller, supra note 176, at 517-19 (describing "The
Practical Death of Use Immunity for Unknown Documents" post-Hubbell).
347 See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 101 (1974).
See Braswell, 487 U.S. at 118. With respect to the "representative
capacity" issue, it should be noted that a key assumption of Braswell does
not survive after the Court's decision in Hubbell. In Braswell, Chief
Justice Rehnquist analyzed the "testimonial nature of the act of
production" when a corporate custodian produces corporate documents and
records. Id. at 114. He asserted that in Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S.
118 (1957), "the line drawn was between oral testimony and other forms of
incrimination," 487 U.S. at 114, and therefore a custodian's act of
production is not sufficiently testimonial to be covered by the privilege. Id.
at 115 n.8 (citing Bellis). The Hubbell decision obviously rejected what it
characterized as this "anemic view" of the testimonial aspects of the act of
production. See 530 U.S. 27, 43 (citing Curcio). Chief Justice Rehnquist's
position as the sole dissenter in Hubbell suggests that he well understood
that the Hubbell majority's conception of the testimonial aspects of the act
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the contrary, in that situation there is such a unity of
interest and identity between the entity and its owner that
using the collective entity doctrine to compel the owner to
produce documents, and in so doing provide testimony,
inappropriately deprives the owner of his or her privilege
against self-incrimination, as the four dissenters in Braswell
recognized." 9  The better approach, and the one most
consistent with the protections intended to be conferred by
the Fifth Amendment, is to recognize that in such cases the
entity does not have an identity separate from that of its
owner and therefore neither should be compelled to provide
incriminating testimony, absent a grant of immunity.35 °
For these reasons Braswell was an unusual case, and
because it was so unusual the Court's concern that
permitting an assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege on
the facts of that case "would have a detrimental impact on
the Government's efforts to prosecute 'white-collar crime,' 35'
was not well founded. The same can be said about the Bellis
case and the similar concerns voiced by the Court in that
of production was at odds with the conception that he had espoused in
Braswell. 530 U.S. at 49.
39 Justice Kennedy wrote that:
[iut is regrettable that the very line of cases which at last
matured to teach these principles is now invoked to curtail
them, for the Court rules that a natural person forfeits the
privilege in a criminal investigation directed against him
and that the Government may use compulsion to elicit
testimonial assertions from a person who faces the threat
of criminal proceedings.
487 U.S. at 119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
350 Ironically, this result is not inconsistent with the pre-Bellis and
pre-Braswell version -of the collective entity doctrine because under the
White test the doctrine applied only if an entity had "a character so
impersonal in the scope of its membership and activities that it cannot be
said to embody the purely private or personal interests of its constituents,
but rather to embody their common or group interests only." See United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944). Cf. Braswell, 487 U.S. at 119
(arguing that the Braswell majority misapplied the collective entity
doctrine in that case) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
351 487 U.S. at 115.
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decision. Mr. Bellis had been a partner in a three-person
Pennsylvania law partnership, but left the firm in late 1969
to join another firm. 52  The three-person partnership's
financial records stayed at the old firm until February or
March 1973, when Bellis sent his secretary to the old firm to
retrieve the records and bring them to his new office.353
Shortly thereafter Bellis received a grand jury subpoena for
the partnership records, and he asserted his Fifth
Amendment privilege and refused to produce the records.35 '
Expressing concern that a partnership not be able to
"immunize its records" from production to government
investigators,355 and asserting that "the applicability of the
[Fifth Amendment] privilege should not turn on
insubstantial differences in the form of the business
enterprise,356 the Bellis Court held that the collective entity
doctrine applied to the three-person law partnership.
The facts of the Bellis case were unusual in that while
Bellis was no longer a member of the partnership, he
nevertheless had managed to obtain sole custody of the
partnership records for the relevant time period during
which he had been a partner in the firm. The members of
the Bellis majority may have been concerned that if they did
not apply the collective entity doctrine to the small, three-
person partnership, future government efforts to obtain
partnership documents might be frustrated if a partner
352 417 U.S. at 86.
353 Id.
31 Id. at 85-87.
355 Id. at 94.
356 Id. at 101. This assertion is notable because in Braswell Chief
Justice Rehnquist expressed no concerns about having the applicability of
the privilege turn upon the legal distinction between a sole proprietorship
and a wholly owned corporation. See 487 U.S. at 104. While he and the
other four members of the Braswell majority may have viewed this as a
"substantial difference," to use the language of Bellis, it is not clear that
business owners who retain sole control of their business but have
incorporated or formed a single-member limited liability company solely to
take advantage of the limited liability shield would agree that the
difference in form is substantial enough to justify depriving them of a
fundamental constitutional right.
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absconded with partnership records.357 That concern may
have had some basis at that time because under pre-Fisher
Fifth Amendment law Bellis could have asserted the
privilege as to the contents of the partnership records in his
custody and control. After Fisher held that the contents of
pre-existing documents are not privileged, however, that
concern is no longer present. In addition, the facts of the
case suggest that, at least after Fisher, any act of production
privilege that Bellis might have sought to assert with respect
to the partnership records could easily have been overcome
by the government in the manner that is described above-
the secretary who obtained the records could have been
compelled to provide testimony (whether or not pursuant to a
grant of immunity) as to the existence, location, and
authenticity of the records that she had obtained for Bellis.358
Once the government obtained that information, Bellis would
357 See 417 U.S. at 99. If this were the Court's concern, even holding
that the collective entity doctrine applies to all forms of business entities,
as Bellis and Braswell taken together suggest, is not sufficient to ensure
that the government will always be able to obtain entity documents. See,
e.g., In re Three Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Dated Jan. 29, 1999,
191 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding, pre-Hubbell, that ex-employees of a
corporation who absconded with corporate documents may assert a
personal act of production privilege as to the documents because the
agency relationship terminated when the employment relationship
terminated). Cf In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 12, 1991, 957
F.2d 807, 810-13 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that the "immutable character
of the records as corporate" requires their production and "dictates that
they are held in a representative capacity.").
358 Cf. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 411 (1976) ("The
existence and location of the papers are a foregone conclusion and the
taxpayer adds little or nothing to the sum total of the Government's
information by conceding that he in fact has the papers."). Cf United
States v. Hubbel, 530 U.S. 27, 44-45 (2000) ("Whatever the scope of this
'foregone conclusion' rationale, the facts of this case plainly fall outside of
it. While in Fisher the Government already knew that the documents
were in the attorneys' possession and could independently confirm their
existence and authenticity through the accountants who created them,
here the Government has not shown that it had prior knowledge of either
the existence or the whereabouts of the 13,120 pages of documents
ultimately produced by respondent.").
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not have been able to assert an act of production privilege.
The facts of Bellis therefore, like the facts of Braswell, do not
support the concerns about interference with law
enforcement that seem to have been the driving force behind
the majority opinions in both of those oases.
4. Conclusion: The Collective Entity Doctrine is
No Longer Needed to Protect Law Enforcement
Interests
This analysis demonstrates that the Supreme Court's
recent cases expanding the collective entity doctrine have
been based upon the flawed premise that an unacceptable
degree of interference with law enforcement would exist if
the Court did otherwise. Those cases also have failed to
adequately assess the effect of important recent changes in
Fifth Amendment law on immunity and production of
documents. At the same time, the explosive proliferation of
new limited liability entities has increased both the breadth
of application of the collective entity doctrine and the
potential for unfairness if that doctrine is applied to certain
kinds of business entities. These are all good reasons to
reexamine, and ultimately to reject, the continued
application of the collective entity doctrine. Additional
significant problems with the collective entity doctrine also
point to the conclusion that the doctrine should be
abandoned.
D. Additional Criticisms of Application of the
Collective Entity Doctrine as Currently Defined by
the Supreme Court to New Forms of Business
Entities
The collective entity doctrine is also subject to criticism
for its failure to comply with one of the central doctrines of
constitutional law-the law governing waiver of
constitutional rights. It has long been settled law that an
effective waiver of a constitutional right requires "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right
No. 1:1] LIMITED LIABILITY ENTITIES
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or privilege." '359 In other words, to be effective, an individual's
waiver of a fundamental constitutional right must involve
"express, intelligent consent"36 ° by a person who "knows what
he is doing and [whose] choice is made with eyes open."361
The collective entity doctrine, particularly as applied by the
Braswell Court, is clearly inconsistent with these principles.
A business owner who decides to form a wholly owned
corporation or a single-member LLC in order to obtain the
benefits of limited liability for debts and obligations incurred
by the business has no reason to believe, or even to suspect,
that the change in operating form of the business will result
in a loss of the owner's Fifth Amendment privilege for the
documents and records of the business. That is the result
that follows from Braswell, however, and after the Supreme
Court's decision in Hubbell it is also clear that the
consequences for the individual of losing the Fifth
3"9 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (announcing
standard for waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel). See also
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) (applying
Johnson standard to waiver of right to jury trial); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963) (applying Johnson standard to waiver of right to appeal). The
Johnson v. Zerbst principles have been applied to waiver of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the context of custodial
interrogation of suspects. See Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 566 (1987)
(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). See also Garrison v. Elo,
156 F. Supp. 2d 815 ( E.D. Mich. 2001) (applying Johnson standard to
guilty pleas).
360 See Adams, 317 U.S. at 277.
361 See id. at 279. Cf. Paul Marcus, A Return to the "Bright Line Rule"
of Miranda, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 93, 136-40 (1993) (discussing waiver
law in custodial interrogation cases and noting that "[tihe burden on the
government to show a knowing and voluntary waiver in Miranda cases is
'great' and 'heavy'") (internal citations omitted); Phong T. Dinh, Topical
Survey, Criminal Law, Self-Incrimination Clause Requires That Suspects
Understand Plain Meaning of Miranda Rights Before Making Valid
Waiver-State v. Leuthavone, 640 A.2d 515 (R.I. 1994), 29 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 619 (1995); W. Brian Stack, Note, Criminal Procedure-Confessions-
Waiver of Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Held Invalid Due to Police
Failure to Inform Suspect of Attorney's Attempt to Contact Him-State v.




Amendment privilege for business records can be
substantial-perhaps even the difference between going to
jail and avoiding prosecution altogether.
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence on waiver of
constitutional rights provides yet another reason to
scrutinize carefully an implied waiver of the kind created by
the Braswell holding. Implied waivers are disfavored and
the Court has developed a presumption "against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights."36  This presumption
should have caused the Braswell Court to pause before
applying the collective entity doctrine to a wholly owned
corporation with the result that the corporation's owner was
effectively treated as having waived his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination by choosing to operate
his business as a wholly owned corporation rather than a
sole proprietorship. As discussed above, however, the five-
member majority of the Court appears to have been more
concerned with protecting law enforcement interests than in
safeguarding constitutional rights; as a consequence, they
applied the collective entity doctrine in a mechanical, knee-
jerk fashion and ignored the issue of whether or not it was
being applied in a manner that was consistent with well-
established waiver doctrine. 6 The clear inconsistency with
362 See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 ("It has been pointed out that 'courts
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver' of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss
of fundamental rights.") (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389,
393 (1937), Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882), and Ohio Bell Tel.
Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937)).
363 In this regard Braswell can be seen as the successor to a long line
of Supreme Court cases that demonstrate a cavalier approach to waiver of
constitutional rights in the criminal process. See generally Michael E.
Tigar, Forward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel,
84 HARv. L. REV. 1, 9 (1970) (examining how the Supreme Court has
applied the Johnson v. Zerbst waiver standard and concluding that "cases
show that it has commonly been ignored"). Professor Tigar's 1970 analysis
of Supreme Court waiver decisions includes a criticism of waiver based
upon agency principles that appears particularly prescient in light of the
Braswell Court's reliance, almost two decades later, on an "agency
rationale" to uphold the collective entity doctrine in a context that in
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waiver law does, however, support an argument that the
collective entity doctrine should be re-examined in the new
era of limited liability entities.
The waiver criticism of the collective entity doctrine as
applied in Braswell is consistent with a final reason not to
deprive limited liability entities of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, a reason that is based
upon more fundamental notions of fairness and equity."
Commentators have asserted that under the "communitarian
theory of limited liability" the individuals who form a limited
liability entity should not be permitted to use the limited
liability form to "hide from their duties as citizens."365 Under
this theory individuals who form LLCs are viewed as having
certain duties as citizens that they should not be permitted
to avoid by forming a limited liability entity, and the state
practical effect amounted to an implied waiver of a constitutional right. In
Professor Tigar's view an agency rationale for waiver "lack[s] any
intelligible account of the meaning of 'consent'" that is required under the
Johnson standard. See id. at 12. In this sense Braswell can be seen not
only as "The Ultimate Expansion of the 'Collective Entity' Doctrine," see
supra Part II.C, but also as the ultimate denigration of the Johnson v.
Zerbst waiver standard.
36 This unfairness in depriving business entities of a Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is not the only unfairness
that has been magnified by the recent explosion of new kinds of limited
liability firms. Both tax law treatment, see Maine, supra note 315, at 238
(discussing the unfairness and inequities of permitting some but not all
private business entities to choose among three applicable tax regimes
"have been magnified recently in light of state legislative responses to
check-the-box entity classification, which have liberalized existing forms of
business organization making them more corporate-like"), and limited
liability law, see Crusto, supra note 305 (describing the unfairness of
denying limited liability to unincorporated sole proprietorships), arguably
are inequitable in their treatment of different forms of business entities.
36 See Cohen, supra note 301, at 457 (discussing the communitarian
theory of limited liability in the context of veil piercing). See also Michael
E. DeBow and Dwight R. Lee, Shareholders, Nonshareholders and
Corporate Law: Communitarianism and Resource Allocation, 18 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 393 (1993). For a comprehensive analysis of communitarian legal
principles in tort law generally, see ROBERT F. COCHRAN JR. & ROBERT M.
ACKERMAN, LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF TORTS (2004).
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grants the right to form such an entity under the implicit
condition that it will not be used to avoid those duties.366 If
one accepts this communitarian view of the limited liability
entity, in which individual members' duties as citizens
survive the formation of the entity, then it follows that
fairness and reciprocity of obligation demand that the
individual members' rights as citizens should also survive
the formation of the entity. High on the list of rights that
should not be arbitrarily withheld is the privilege against
self-incrimination with respect to the operation of the entity.
The contrary position yields the anomalous result that we
see under current law when we compare the Braswell and
Hubbell cases-Randy Braswell loses his Fifth Amendment
privilege because he chose to operate his business as a
wholly owned corporation while Webster Hubbell retains his
privilege (and avoids prosecution) because he operated his
business as a sole proprietor. This result is untenable,
particularly when, as discussed above, those who form
limited liability entities neither know nor intend that their
actions constitute a waiver of a fundamental constitutional
right. In this important respect the current conception of the
collective entity doctrine represents the worst of all possible
worlds-an unnecessary and unjustifiable legal doctrine that
treats similarly situated people differently.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The world of business entity formation has changed
dramatically in the almost two decades since the Supreme
Court decided Braswell v. United States and a narrow five-
four majority declined to reexamine the collective entity
doctrine. The world of Fifth Amendment immunity and
document production law had already changed dramatically
at the time Braswell was decided, but the Braswell majority
failed to recognize the significance of those changes. Beyond
these extremely important changes in the legal doctrines
that underlie the collective entity doctrine, the very manner
366 See Cohen, supra note 301, at 457 n.163.
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in which business entities are subjected to the criminal
justice system has been transformed in recent decades. All
of these important developments in the law point to the same
conclusion: the collective entity doctrine should be
abandoned.
The only real argument in favor of retaining the collective
entity doctrine is, to paraphrase Chief Justice Rehnquist in
Braswell, its lengthy-although hardly distinguished-
pedigree. But survival over a long period based upon a
shifting series of rationales, none of which withstands
principled analysis, is not sufficient reason to retain a flawed
legal doctrine. Doing so becomes even less defensible if the
legal doctrine results in unfair and inequitable treatment of
individuals who are facing loss of both property and liberty,
as is the case with the collective entity doctrine. Add the
final element that the doctrine no longer is necessary to
further law enforcement interests, and every argument for
retaining the doctrine has been rebutted. This Article
demonstrates that the doctrine is of dubious origin, lacks
principled doctrinal support, and no longer even serves a
significant normative or utilitarian purpose. In short, it is
an anomaly of constitutional law that should no longer be
preserved.
Assuming that the Supreme Court cannot be expected to
overturn the collective entity doctrine in the near future, and
assuming that Congress lacks the power to enact a
legislative fix of a flawed interpretation of the Constitution
by the Court, then what can be done, beyond registering
academic complaints in law review articles? One thing that
can be done immediately is for courts and criminal litigants
to recognize the flaws in the collective entity doctrine and
seek to halt its heretofore relentless expansion. Litigants
should challenge the doctrine, and its validity should be
reexamined by the courts, at each and every opportunity in
any case involving a fact pattern that is not indisputably
governed by controlling precedent. Courts should no longer
be mechanically applying the doctrine to any new entity or
new fact situation that arguably is within its purview. In
particular, it should not be applied to single-member limited
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liability entities, notwithstanding Braswell. The "agency
rationale" relied upon in Bellis and Braswell should not be
applied to single-member limited liability companies, which
are more akin to sole proprietorships (albeit ones that have
registered with the state to obtain limited liability) than
corporations, or at least should be considered so for purposes
of application of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Applying the collective entity doctrine to
single-member entities in the way that Braswell applied the
doctrine to a wholly owned corporation both results in unfair
treatment of similarly situated individuals and is contrary to
established legal doctrines governing waiver of constitutional
rights and privileges.
There is also opportunity for courts and litigants to
reexamine the collective entity doctrine beyond the relatively
narrow issue of whether the doctrine should be applied to
single-member limited liability companies. Courts and
litigants should seize upon the Supreme Court's open
invitation at the conclusion of the Bellis opinion to reject
application of the collective entity doctrine to "a small family
partnership" or to a partnership in which there is "some
other pre-existing relationship of confidentiality among the
partners."36 These Supreme Court-sanctioned exceptions to
the application of the collective entity doctrine should also be
vigorously exploited in cases involving general partnerships,
member-managed limited liability companies, limited
liability partnerships, and any other business entities that
feature the expectations of confidentiality and the lack of
"representative capacity" of members that the Court
referenced in Bellis. This more rigorous and discerning
application of the collective entity doctrine should avoid some
of the worst abuses that will result if it is instead applied in
a mechanistic, indiscriminate fashion to new forms of
business entities. More importantly, over time more rigorous
application of the doctrine should help reveal the
fundamental truth that the collective entity doctrine is both
unjustified and unnecessary.
367 See Bellis, 417 U.S. at 101.
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Once this central truth is recognized, the courts will be
more likely to take the next step and consider abandoning
the collective entity doctrine altogether and conforming this
aspect of Fifth Amendment law with the treatment of
business entities under other provisions of the Bill of Rights.
As this Article demonstrates, permitting corporations and
other kinds of business entities to assert a Fifth Amendment
privilege would not have any significant adverse effect on
law enforcement and would rationalize Fifth Amendment
law in this important area. Abandoning the collective entity
doctrine also would eliminate the arbitrary disparity
between sole proprietorships and wholly owned corporations
or single-member limited liability that is the result of the
Braswell and Hubbell holdings under current law.
